

Comrades Plus Brothers: Sino-Soviet Border Relations in the 1950s

by Li Danhui*

National borders are inviolable. Respect for a country's territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders is a necessary condition for peaceful co-existence. However, a study of the way in which cross-border relations between China and the Soviet Union developed from friendly and peaceful relations to disputes, friction and even military confrontation, is by no means a simple matter of respect or violation of territorial integrity. In fact, the resurgence of the Sino-Soviet border problem and the development of Sino-Soviet relations occurred in the context of the Cold War against the changing background of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Based on domestic and overseas archives, this article attempts to present a relatively objective and complete picture of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s, from the perspective of the development of the border policies of the two countries and the changing situation in the border provinces. It also seeks to explore and analyze the causes behind these developments.

I. The Origin of the Sino-Soviet Border Problem

The full length of the Sino-Soviet border is about 7,600 kilometers. But there were actually three borderlines: 1. The treaty line. From 1689 when China and Russia signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk till 1915 when the Sino-Russian Horergusi River border document was signed, the former Chinese government had signed a series of treaties with the Tsarist Russian government, according to which the demarcated full length of the Sino-Russian boundary was about 11,000 kilometers, and more than 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory was ceded. In January 1946, the Nationalist government formally acknowledged the independence of Outer Mongolia. As a result, most of the northern section of the Sino-Soviet boundary became the border between the USSR and Mongolia. The eastern section of the Sino-Soviet border was more than 4,200 kilometers long, and the western more than 3,300 kilometers long. Thus, the boundary designated in the early Sino-Russian treaties was finally decided. However, no previous Chinese governments had ever formally publicly acknowledged any treaties or agreements between China and Russia on ceding Chinese territories. 2. The USSR map line, or the boundary line demarcated in the large-scale map (1:100,000 for the eastern section, 1:200,000 for the western section) drawn by the USSR. Deviating from the treaty line, the Soviet map puts its

boundary line within Chinese territory in many areas. This deviates from the treaty line and in practice has put some Chinese territory under the USSR in violation of the treaty. For example, the boundary line along almost all of the Heilongjiang River and the Wusuli River is drawn to the Chinese bank of the river, with the islands on the Chinese side of the main channel are marked as belonging to the USSR. Successive Chinese governments have never recognized the Soviet map line. 3. The line of actual control. In some areas, the boundary under actual USSR control is in compliance with or basically in compliance with either the treaty line or the Soviet map line, while in other sections, its practical control not only goes far beyond the treaty line, but also beyond the Soviet map line, resulting in the *de facto* occupation of some Chinese territory. The Chinese line of actual control basically does not go beyond the treaty line, but in some areas, it crosses the Soviet map line.¹

The complexity of the co-existence of three boundary lines on the Sino-Soviet border resulted in territorial disputes between the two countries and left in dispute a number of areas and islands with an overall area of up to 35,000 square kilometers. Designated as Chinese territory in the Sino-Russian historic treaties but occupied by Tsarist Russia by force, Tuva and the 64 villages to the east of the Heilongjiang River are other two disputed regions of more than 170,000 square kilometers.

Before the founding of the PRC, general stability and peace had been the rule on the Sino-Russian border. However, the 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory occupied by the Tsarist Russia by treaty implementation according to the Western international law, the 35,000 square kilometers of disputed region between China and the USSR, plus the 170,000 square meters in Tuva and the 64 villages in the east of Heilongjiang River were “territorial debts” to be resolved by the new Chinese government.

II. The New Chinese Government’s Attitude and Policy To the Sino-Soviet Border Issue

From the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1st 1949, the establishment, consolidation and development of an alliance with the USSR was the first priority of Chinese foreign policy. New China had just been inaugurated and desperately needed a secure and stable international environment to facilitate her economic construction, and the USSR was then the most reliable guarantee of security for China. In the process of economic recovery, industrialization and the transition to socialism, within the limitations of the international environment, the USSR was the only possible source capable of offering large-scale aid to China. Therefore, obtaining economic aid from the USSR became the main objective of China’s foreign policy; while in the two opposing camps of socialism and capitalism, China and the USSR had common enemies and shared common security interests. Thus, throughout the 1950s, consolidation and unity with the USSR remained new China’s fundamental foreign policy. Accordingly, the Communist Party of China (CPC)

took a cautious attitude to the Sino-Russian boundary issue inherited from the past. In this period, the Chinese attitude to and policy on the Sino-Soviet boundary issue was mainly reflected in its attitude to the unequal treaties between China and Russia, and the principle of dealing with the disputed territories.

1. Attitudes and policies on the unequal treaties between China and Russia

Mao Zedong's reassertion during his visit to the USSR at the end of 1949 of the Soviet government's abrogation of the unequal treaties between China and the Tsarist Russia after the October Revolution was in fact a reiteration of his stand declared in the 7th CPC Congress, i.e., in a political sense, the unequal treaties between China and the USSR no longer existed.² In declaring its stand in this way, China's original intention was simply to promote the creation of a Sino-Soviet alliance as early as possible; this did not yet constitute a fully developed set of guidelines for resolving the Sino-Soviet border issue. However, these guidelines in fact set the tone for resolution of the historical legacy of border problems.

A few years later, the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC) proposed guidelines for resolving boundary issues between China and its neighboring countries: firstly, China would "neither affirm nor deny" any boundary-related treaties and agreements signed by the former Chinese government and foreign countries, and would try to maintain the current boundary situation. Secondly, China would devote its best efforts to researching the issues and making active preparations to resolve border issues. With regard to the old boundary-related treaties, the CCCPC gave instructions that "they should be dealt with in compliance with the general principles of international law." Three principles had to be abided by in the research on historic documents: historical facts must be followed and acknowledged; historic connections must not be cut off; history must be treated according to the current situation and the nation's policy. It was also proposed that boundary issues should be resolved by peaceful negotiations rather than changing the current situation by force, and fundamental guidelines and principles for negotiations were also decided.³ Although such guidelines and principles were proposed in light of the Sino-Burmese boundary issue, they provided guidance for the general solution of boundary issues with other neighboring countries including the USSR.

Thus, in the 1950s, though the Chinese government had not formally declared that it recognized the unequal Sino-Russian boundary treaties and treaties involved with boundary clauses, it had actually accepted the legal status of what had originally been Chinese territory. In this sense, the first "territorial account" between China and the USSR had been balanced.

The independence of Outer Mongolia lay beyond the scope of the unequal Sino-Russian treaties and was the outcome of an agreement reached by the Chinese Nationalists and the USSR when they signed the friendly alliance treaty in August 1945. When China and the USSR signed a new treaty in early 1950, as an outcome of the old treaty, the independence of Outer Mongolia once again became an issue which the new Chinese government could either recognize or deny. However, in

negotiations, China only used this issue as a bargaining chip to realize their negotiating objective: i.e. in exchange for acknowledging the independence of Mongolia, the new Chinese government forced the USSR to return the Chuangchun Railway and Lüshun port at the request of China. After this, when Krushchev headed a USSR government delegation on a visit to China in 1954, Mao Zedong proposed the return of Mongolia to China in his meeting with Krushchev, but the proposal was rejected.⁴ Indeed, this tentative proposal was nothing more than a response on the part of Chinese leaders to the messages they got from the USSR; and there was no intention of considering the territory's sovereignty. From then until the end of the 1950s, the issue of Mongolia was no longer raised by China with the USSR in relation to territorial possession.

2. Attitudes and policies on the territorial disputes between China and the USSR

The objective existence of the historical legacy of the boundary question and territorial disputes between China and the USSR remained a sensitive issue for the USSR. It was crucial to the full national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, but more importantly, it was essential to the stability of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early stage of the founding of the PRC. On the other hand, as allies in the same camp and members of the big socialist family, their ideological standards in dealing with national relations diluted the territorial disputes between the two countries. Faced with the threat of war on China by the United States and with too limited a frontier defense force to safeguard all disputed islands, mountains and regions, Chinese leaders felt they had to continue with the existing USSR occupation and rely on the defense forces of the USSR, as this would be in the common security interests of both countries and the common interests of the socialist camp. Thus one can say that the CCCPC's principles in dealing with the territorial disputes between China and the USSR in this period were heavily tinged with the Cold War mentality. If we survey the overall strategies China adopted in dealing with territorial affairs with the USSR in the 1950s, the CCCPC's policies on this issue were always characterized by caution, avoidance and tolerance. In a sense, the smooth development of a friendly and neighborly relationship between China and the USSR in this period was, to a great extent, the result of mutual trust, i.e. there was no crisis of trust arising from territorial demands from either side.

China and the USSR signed the treaty of friendly alliance and mutual assistance in February 1950. In their promise of mutual respect for territorial integrity, there was no reservation that hinted at any territorial disputes existing between the two countries. For the first ten years after the founding of the PRC, in their association with the USSR, the CPC and the Chinese leaders neither mentioned the existence of territorial disputes between China and the USSR nor raised any objections to the legality and reasonableness of the Sino-Soviet boundary, so much so that they even took a generous and unassertive attitude to affairs concerning the boundary alignment and territorial disputes.

For example, the Sino-Soviet Agreement on Boundary River Navigation and Construction signed in January 1951 in practice served as grounds for the USSR's not abiding by the common law practice of demarcating boundaries by the central line of the main channel in the boundary river in accordance with international law. Not taking it as a border agreement, China did not raise any objections.⁵ In the early 1950s, the USSR provided the Chinese government with a whole set of modern large-scale maps marked with boundary lines. Deviating from the treaty line, the Soviet map drew the boundary line within Chinese territory in many areas, but China did not raise any objections with the USSR at the time. Although the then published Chinese map collections still marked the Sino-Soviet boundary in accordance with the treaty line, it was not until the end of the 1950s that China expressed its opinion that the Sino-Soviet boundary line issue still existed. At the same time it also stated its tolerant attitude, i.e. the boundary line could be as marked in the Soviet map until these problems were resolved.⁶

The tolerant and unassertive attitude of the CCCPC to the disputed regions between China and the USSR was prominently reflected in their principles in dealing with territorial disputes and border conflicts between the two countries. For example, in the eastern section of the Sino-Soviet boundary, in 1954, Aihui county of Heilongjiang province once requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to negotiate with the USSR on returning to China the 100 or so islands that originally belonged to China. In 1955, a few fishermen from Luobei county wrote a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting that it negotiate with the USSR on returning a few islands. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered that these matters could be left temporarily unresolved, and instructed the local governments to educate the residents and explain the issue to them. The Heilongjiang provincial government accordingly requested that border counties educate the cadres and residents to have a holistic view of the defense of the Sino-Soviet boundary, rather than simply highlighting the partial interests of the local residents.⁷

In this period, a serious boundary dispute did occur in the western section of the Sino-Soviet border: border patrol groups of the two countries challenged each other and fired warning shots within their own territory. However, this incident was brought under control by peaceful means. After this, due to the disputes on the Sino-Soviet boundary, the USSR proposed in September to hold negotiations attended by representatives from the border control forces of the USSR and China. China accepted the proposal. However, the eruption of the troubles in Poland and Hungary made the USSR request a postponement of the meeting. This was because if the USSR and China held talks on the boundary issue, adversaries would probably see it as evidence of contradictions between the two countries. China agreed, and believed that the two governments would easily agree with each other in future boundary issues.⁸

In addition, the tolerance towards the resolution of Sino-Soviet boundary disputes taken by the CCCPC led, to some extent, to a casual attitude towards resolving

boundary disputes of grassroots agencies in the Sino-Soviet border provinces. These included some very interesting examples: without permission, the Raohe county government held talks with the USSR on the ownership of some islands and the Fuyuan county government even regained two islands in their negotiations with the USSR side.⁹

In January 1957, the USSR leaders invited Zhou Enlai to the USSR, Poland and Hungary to help Krushchev coordinate and solve the sharp contradictions between Moscow and Warsaw and Budapest after the crises in Poland and Hungary. In a meeting with Krushchev and some other officials during his visit, Zhou Enlai criticized the USSR for unfairly solving some territorial issues in Europe,¹⁰ but did not mention territorial issues between China and the USSR.

Some time later, the Chinese Communist Party initiated the Rectification Movement. Such topics as the existing Sino-Soviet territorial and boundary issues were raised as part of the free expression of views. This could be regarded as the first time territorial disputes over the Sino-Soviet boundary had been touched on since the founding of the PRC. However, it was only one contending opinion and not representative of the attitude of the CCCPC. What's more, such views were classified as a furious attack on the CPC by the bourgeois rightists. With regard to territorial disputes over the Sino-Soviet boundary, the CCCPC had always insisted on the policy of caution, tolerance, and restraint.

Overall, in the ten years from 1949 to 1959, 22 disputes took place along the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese side had upheld the policy of solving problems by peaceful negotiation, and the USSR also adopted a stance aimed at preserving friendship and unity.¹¹

III. An Almost Borderless and Undefended Boundary Line of Brotherly Friendship

In the 1950s, the long Sino-Soviet boundary was basically borderless and undefended. By "borderless" is meant that, despite the existence of the treaty line, the Soviet map line and the actual control line, the border lines were rather ambiguously demarcated in many areas. And by "undefended" is meant that for a long time, China had not deployed any defense force in most sections along the Sino-Soviet boundary area, and its border control force had been rather weak. For example, the Yili county in the western section of the Sino-Soviet border shared a boundary line as long as 1,500 kilometers with the USSR, but only two border control stations and one check point had been placed there and the actual border control line was only 300 kilometers or so. What was more, only 30% of the border area could be patrolled every few days, while patrols would not or could not reach some other areas at all. In the eastern section of the Sino-Soviet boundary, there was almost no border defense force along the whole boundary line.¹² This borderless and undefended situation had not only resulted in sporadic disputes and conflicts between the above mentioned

Chinese border residents and the USSR border control personnel; between the border residents of both sides and between the patrol personnel of the two countries, but also had led residents and livestock from both sides, and especially the Chinese side, who had formed the habit of fishing, hunting and herding over many years, to make frequent random visits across borders, so that border trespassing had become a common phenomenon.

1. An ambiguous consciousness of national boundaries on the part of Chinese border residents

After an alliance had been established between China and the USSR, on the one hand, the USSR provided large scale aid to China, China initiated a campaign of all-round learning from the USSR, and full play was given to friendly and brotherly affection between China and the USSR; on the other hand, the Korean war broke out, China aided Korea by fighting against the USA, and there was an overwhelming wave of anti-American imperialist feeling in China. In such a situation, the perception of national boundaries by the Chinese people was naturally established on the basis of ideology, and their consciousness of boundary lines was weak or ambiguous.

As executive organs of the central policy, both the Party and the administrative agencies in the Sino-Soviet boundary provinces had a precise understanding of the policy and guidelines precisely and their ambiguous interpretation of modern boundaries was more mixed up with the “Cold War” consciousness. Local officials not only had to highlight the importance of Sino-Soviet unity in fighting against the imperialist policies of invasion and war, and the significance of the USSR in helping defend China against imperialist subversion and sabotage, but also had to educate the boundary residents to criticize narrow nationalism, to see clearly the unanimity of the interests of the people of China and the USSR, and not to be too particular about the interests of one moment, one place or one person when dealing with the disputed areas or disputed islands.¹³

Since fishing, hunting and herding in some disputed regions were directly related to the daily life of average boundary residents, their weak and ambiguous consciousness of borders and national boundaries was intermingled with their pursuit of economic interests. In the eyes of these simple boundary residents “the USSR is our elder brother, and there is no problem in going there to have a little to eat or bringing a little back. China and the USSR are friends; boundary trespass is of no consequence. What is more, these islands originally belonged to us, so we can fish and cut firewood at will.”¹⁴

There were other complications in relation to border residents’ consciousness of national boundaries. In the western section of the Sino-Soviet boundary, especially in Yili county of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the border line issue was mingled with ethnic issues that even confused the border residents’ concept of motherland. Ethnic minority children in the whole Yili region only knew the USSR and Moscow and had no idea of China or Beijing; while many intellectuals, ethnic minority

cadres and masses had taken the USSR as their own motherland, and saw China only as their second motherland. Such a confused and weak consciousness in regard to the motherland impelled the CCP and the local governments in Yili county to initiate a “Three One” education campaign for county residents in 1962: “one Party—the Chinese Communist Party, one motherland—the People’s Republic of China, and one road—socialism.”¹⁵

2. Casual and colorful boundary trespass by the Chinese border residents

The weak and ambiguous consciousness of national boundaries constituted a psychological basis for boundary trespass by the border residents, while the fact of a border without limits or defense and the weak border control in the Sino-Soviet boundary region provided objective conditions for border residents to trespass across the boundary.

In terms of numbers, from 1954 to 1957, the number of Chinese people who trespassed into the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Soviet boundary varied from dozens to hundreds each year, but only a few Soviet residents trespassed into China. Taking Heilongjiang province as an example, in 1954, 94 Chinese crossed to the USSR, but only a few from USSR trespassed in the reverse direction ten or so when they were hunting on horseback, and they returned immediately. There were also two drunken farmers who crossed into Chinese territory. In 1955, more than 50 Chinese crossed the boundary, but only two did so from the Soviet side.

Among the trespassers, there were students, villagers, unemployed persons, the mentally ill, thieves, escaped criminals, Soviet people living in China, people who lost their way, geological prospecting personnel who went into the USSR territory by mistake, and cadres, etc.

The purposes of trespassers were even more diverse, but the primary purposes included picking wild fruit, wild vegetables, fungus, Chinese yams, cutting firewood, hunting, gathering deer horn, and fishing. What they gained was either for sale in the city or for subsidizing their daily life. A secondary purpose was herding or chasing horses and other animals. Other purposes included looking for work, study, leaving because of family disputes, sightseeing, seeking novelty, smuggling and burglary, and teasing the USSR border forces by deliberately leaving misleading footprints on the soft soil of the USSR side, etc.¹⁶

3. Ways in which the Chinese and USSR local governments dealt with incidents of trespass

In addition to the above-mentioned elements of ideological concepts and border control status, boundary trespass by Chinese border residents, which had been repeatedly banned but still occurred frequently, also had some relation to the lenient border administration system in the border provinces of China. In fact, although some border provinces had initiated educational and administrative measures with regard to border residents since early 1950s, in a general friendly environment between China

and the USSR, border control status still remained lenient. Although banned repeatedly, boundary trespass by border residents could not be stopped.

In this period, the most common way the USSR side dealt with trespass by Chinese people and animals was to temporarily detain the trespassers, then repatriate them after negotiations with the Chinese side, or drive them back immediately; livestock that crossed the boundary would be directly driven back to Chinese territory. The Chinese and the USSR border control departments met on a regular basis, negotiating issues such as trespass by people and livestock, etc. On the basis of negotiation with the Chinese side, the USSR side could make compromises with regard to boundary trespass by Chinese under certain situations. While the Chinese side strengthened education for border residents on abiding by national boundary regulations and respecting national boundary demarcation on the one hand, on the other hand, they gave the necessary punishment according to law to those who had committed serious boundary trespass and refused to mend their ways despite repeated admonition. As for burglars, the public security authorities would detain and bring them to justice.¹⁷

Although the in-depth psychological reasons for the border residents' trespass were related with the unsettled Sino-Soviet boundary territory disputes, it is reasonable to say that boundary trespass was caused by lenient border control administration and weak policies and legal education, rather than territorial disputes. When both sides could deal with boundary trespass in a friendly way, the Sino-Soviet boundary had one more guarantee of peace and tranquility.

IV. China Was Ready to Initiate Resolution of the Sino-Soviet Border Issue

In 1958, Mao Zedong initiated the "Great Leap Forward" Movement in China. At the same time as it tried to surpass the UK and to catch up with the USA, China conducted a stealthy competition with the USSR. In this period, the leap forward in the Chinese economy and the consolidation of China's status in the socialist camp and the international communist movement made a peaceful and stable neighboring environment a necessity for the country. Indeed, the existence of some unsettled boundary issues between China and quite a few neighboring countries had become an element of potential insecurity. Therefore, China accelerated steps to resolve boundary issues.

In April of 1958, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a notice stating that China would solve its boundary issues with neighboring countries step by step. The priority for boundary research should lie in unsettled boundaries and settled but disputed boundaries. Afterwards, the State Council Boundary Committee was established in July. Under this, two groups were set up consisting of the socialist and the capitalist countries. The working plan of the former was to try to resolve the Sino-Mongolian boundary issue in 1958 and the Sino-Soviet, the Sino-Vietnamese and the Sino-DPRK boundary issues in 1959. The eastern section of the Sino-Soviet

boundary was demarcated by rivers and there were boundary monuments in most parts of the western section. Apart from the Pamirs section where there was no settled boundary, all the other sections had been demarcated. There were still some other issues in some other sections due to changes in the river course. For example, both sides had different views on the ownership of more than 200 small islands in the Heilongjiang River and there were two disputed areas in Xinjiang section as well. All these problems had to be further clarified.¹⁸

In August, the State Council again decided to set up boundary working groups in the relevant border provinces and regions to take care of local boundary issues. After this, boundary working groups or investigation groups were set up successively in the border provinces and regions. In December, the CCCPC issued the Instructions on Strengthening Boundary Work, requesting that the opportunity be taken to improve preparatory work so as to avoid unfavorable situations in dealing with boundary issues with a neighboring country. In that year, reconnoitering of terrain, surveying and research by the boundary working groups and investigation groups in the Sino-Soviet border provinces and regions were conducted objectively on a basis of friendship and mutual trust.¹⁹

From 1959, boundary issues became an obtrusive problem for China. Among them, the greatest tension surrounded the Sino-Indian boundary. The boundary committee focused on this and the investigation of boundaries with other countries had been suspended. Since there had been no formal negotiations on boundary issues with the brotherly socialist countries in order to avoid provocation or ideological confusion among the border residents of the other side, the surveying and reconnoitering in all the regions had basically been conducted covertly. The boundaries between China and its socialist neighboring countries remained stable that year. According to the assessment by the boundary committee of the State Council, the boundaries between China and its socialist neighbors could be classified as of the following three types: first, where the original disputes remained unsettled but did not result in serious problems; second, where the original disputes remained unsettled and new problems had emerged; third, where both sides had agreed to solve the boundary issue by negotiation but some minor issues had arisen before the conditions for negotiation were mature. The situation on the Sino-Soviet boundary belonged to the first type. On the basis of the foreign affairs instruction of continuing to strengthen unity and cooperation with the USSR, the concrete working plan for the Sino-Soviet boundary issue remained at the stage of researching the issue and making proposals on resolving the problem, etc.²⁰

Large disputed regions existed in the western section and the boundary group of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was formally established in March 1959. The group was supposed to complete an in-depth investigation on current issues in the Sino-Soviet boundary by September of that year and were to propose their solutions in compliance with the preliminary views on solving the Sino-Soviet boundary issue made by the Autonomous Region.²¹

While the work of solving the Sino-Soviet boundary issue was steadily proceeding, the change in Party relations between China and the USSR from 1958 to 1959 were an external force that influenced this process. Ill-feeling between the two countries cast a shadow over the promising prospects of this work. When boundary disputes arose between China and India in 1959, the USSR realized rapidly that China might adopt the same method of resolving the boundary disputes with other countries that it had used in India. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR submitted a detailed report entitled "On the USSR-China Boundary Issue" to the Central Committee of Communist Party of the USSR on September 8. When a neutral statement released by TASS on September 9 was taken by China as biased towards India, China responded by publicizing the differences between the communist parties of China and the USSR.²² With the growth of discord between China and the USSR, the Chinese started to put the territorial and boundary issue on the table; this pair of brothers would keep careful accounts now.

On September 15 of that year, the report prepared for Krushchev's visit to China by the Far East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that the Chinese "rightists" had made a territorial demand but such opinions were not taken as the official stance of China.²³ To date, this is the first report on the Chinese attitude toward the Sino-Soviet boundary issue to have been found in the official files of the USSR. In other words, this was the first time Soviet officialdom formally took cognizance of a territorial demand by China. In actuality, however, the then leadership of the USSR regarded 1957 as the year that Pandora's box was opened. As Rachmanin (under the pen name of Borisov), the USSR expert on Sino-Soviet relations, soon pointed out: "Although the attacks by the rightists were repulsed, the Chinese Party leaders had retained their territorial demands, a fact which went unnoticed by the Russians".²⁴

On October 2nd, a fierce debate broke out between Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders and Khrushchev during the latter's visit to China. Afterwards, both sides still adhered to the goal of solidarity and friendship between the two Parties, on the condition that the other side acknowledge its errors. From the 1960s, relations between the two Parties seemed set on an irreversible downward path. Boundary conflicts arose and the boundary issues that had been set aside for several decades were raised in a formally and publicly. Old wounds were reopened and two sides' strategies for resolving boundary issues moved from friendly negotiation to sharp clashes with little communication. The halcyon days of the Sino-Soviet border region were gone for good.

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Notes

¹ See the Central Military Commission's Report on Sino-Soviet, Sino-Mongolian border control work meetings and 7 files instructed and transferred by the Central Government. Annex 5: The adjusting plan of our practical control line and patrol line along the Sino-Soviet boundary. JiLin Archives, 1/19-1/243, P9-10; etc.

² Cf. Compilation and Translation Bureau, CCCPC (ed.), *Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of P.R.China* (vol I), Beijing: the Compilation and Translation Press, 1987, p. 189; Mao Zedong, *On the Coalition Government* (April 24th, 1945), and *The Collection of Reports and Speeches by Mao Zedong in the 7th CPC Congress*, edited by the Compilation and Translation Bureau, CCCPC, Beijing: Compilation and Translation Press, 1995, p.82.

³ Liao Xinwen, Principles and Solutions of China for Handling Territorial Boundary Issues in the 1950s, a paper submitted to the "China in the 1950s" International Academic Symposium, held by Fudan University, August 14-16, 2004, pp. 2-3, pp. 8-10.

⁴ Cf. Shen Zhihua, "Interests, Disputes and Solutions in the Negotiations on Treaties between China and the USSR," *Historical Research*, 2001, no. 2, p. 52; Minutes of Meeting for Chairman Mao's Receiving the Middle and Left Wing Representatives of Japanese Socialist Party on July 10th, 1964, Guangxi Archives, X1/35/116, p. 40; Shi Zhe, *My life: An Autobiography of Shi Zhe*, transcribed by Shi Qiulang, Beijing: People's Press, 2001, pp. 447-448.

⁵ See Tang Jiaxuan (ed.), *Dictionary of the Chinese Foreign Affairs*, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2000, p. 731; George Ginsburgs, *From Soviet to Russia: International Law Studies in Continuity and Change*, Cambridge, 1998, p. 266.

⁶ See the report by Andropov, Gromyko and Rachmanin (Sept.8,1969), ЦХСД, ф.4, оп.19, д.555, л.л.2-3; O.B. Borisov and B.T.Kolosov, *The Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1980*, translated by Xiao Dongchuan and Tan Shi, Beijing: Joint Publishing Corporation, 1982, pp. 220-221; The letter to the director general of the Surveying and Mapping Department, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1959 by the director general of the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping of China, В.С.Мясников, Е.Д.Степанов, *Границы Китая: История формирования*, Москва 2001, с.198-199.

⁷ See the Report on relevant issues in the Sino-Soviet boundary by the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee and Heilongjiang Provincial People's Committee on December 5th, 1956, Heilongjiang Archives, 34/3/337, p. 88.

⁸ See the Report of the investigation on Sino-Soviet border in Yili Region by the Yili county Foreign Affairs Sub Division on September 24th, 1960, Yili County Archives, 11/1/134, pp. 3-14; *Границы Китая: История формирования*, с.199.

⁹ See the Report on the Sino-Soviet border issues by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Heilongjiang provincial government in September 1954, Heilongjiang Archives, 34/3/257, pp. 72-74.

¹⁰ Minutes of Meeting for Chairman Mao's Receiving the Middle and Left Wing Representatives of Japanese Socialist Party on July 10th, 1964, Guangxi Archives, X1/35/116, pp. 37-46; Переговоры Н.С.Хрущева с Мао Цзэдуном 31 июля - 3 августа 1958 г. и 2 октября 1959 г., *Новая и новейшая история*, 2001, №2, с.111-126.

¹¹ See Address by Liu Zhuanlian, vice commander of Shenyang Military Area Command, in the border control work meeting of the Military Commission on Sept.24th, 1963, Jilin Archives, 1/19-1/243, pp. 68-81.

¹² See the Investigation Report to the Foreign Affairs Office of the People's Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region by Huang Jinming on October 10th 1962, Yili County Archives, 11/1/114, pp. 154-155; the Report on Relevant Issues in the Sino-Soviet Boundary by the headquarters of the PLA Public Security Border Control No.1 Regiment in 1956, Jilin Archives, 77/2/17, p. 24; etc.

¹³ See the Report on the Sino-Soviet boundary issues by the Foreign Affairs Office of Heilongjiang provincial government in September 1954, Heilongjiang Archives, 34/3/257, pp. 70-72; etc.

¹⁴ See the Report on the Sino-Soviet boundary issues by the Foreign Affairs Office of Heilongjiang provincial government in September 1954, Heilongjiang Archives, 34/3/257, pp. 72-74; etc.

¹⁵ See the Summary of border control work meeting of the public security division of Bortala autonomous county on March 28, 1963, Yili County Archives, 11/1/120, pp. 228, 231; etc.

¹⁶ For the above-mentioned items of number, elements and purpose of trespassers, See the Report on the Sino-Soviet Border Issues by the Foreign Affairs Division of Heilongjiang provincial government in September 1954, Heilongjiang Archives, 34/3/257, pp. 72-74, etc.

¹⁷ See A Few Requests for Instructions in Implementing "Regulations On Border Control Work in Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian Boundary Regions" by the Communist Party Committee of the Jilin provincial Armed Police Force on August 8th 1962, Jilin Archives, 1/1-18/245, p. 3; the Report on Relevant Issues in the Sino-Soviet Boundary by the headquarters of the PLA Public Security Border Control No.1 Regiment in 1956, Jilin Archives, 77/2/17, p. 24; etc.

¹⁸ See the Notice On the Boundary Issue by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 25th, 1958, Jilin Archives, 77/4/1, pp. 15-16; the Report on the Working Problems of Boundary Committees by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 16th, 1958, Guangxi Archives, X50/2/290, pp. 5-10.

¹⁹ See the Notice on Organizing Boundary Working Group by the State Council on August 8th, 1958, Guangxi Archives, X50/2/290, p. 4; the Instructions on Strengthening Boundary Work by the CCCPC on December 13th, 1958, Guangxi Archives, X50/2/258, pp. 37-38; etc.

²⁰ See the 1959 Working Summary and 1960 Plan by the Boundary Committee of the State Council on March 14th, 1960, Guangxi Archives, X50/3/37, pp. 85-89; etc.

²¹ See the Report on Work Development of Establishing the Regional Boundary Group by the boundary group of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on March 4th, 1959, Yili county Archives, 11/1/74, pp. 10-14; etc.

²² See M.Y.Prozumenschikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, p. 252; the Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Chervonenko, the USSR ambassador to China, on January 26th 1960, *A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949-1976)* vol.2, pp. 283-284; etc.

²³ See Mark Kramer, "The USSR Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (ed.), *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issues 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, p. 178.

²⁴ Su Chi, "Sino-Soviet Border Negotiations:1969-1978," in Lin Enxian, ed., *Collected Papers of the International Symposium on Chinese Border Areas*, Tai Shui, Taiwan, National University of Politics, April 30th, 1985, pp. 782, 849-850.