Superpower under Pressure:
The Secret Speech of Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov in East Berlin, March 1957
By Svend Aage Christensen and Frede P. Jensen
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1957 was marked by initiatives toward the third world, and by a largely staged international campaign against the nuclear armament of the defense of the NATO-countries. In a hectic sequence of events, initiatives in the German question and concrete suggestions about force reductions and bans against nuclear and hydrogen weapons (opening of the UN Conference on Disarmament in London on 19 March) alternate with long series of test explosions, crude nuclear disinformation, and diplomatic attempts at persuasion and intimidation (the letters of Prime Minister Bulganin to several countries including Norway and Denmark, 27 and 30 March).
The display of activities by the Soviet leadership must be assumed to have been conditioned partly by internal conditions (demands of an uncompromising approach towards the West from the Stalinist wing in the Kremlin and from China) and partly caused by bare realities of power politics in the shape of the simultaneous deployment of American land-based nuclear weapons for the NATO forces, which made the Russians more vulnerable, and which they did not immediately have a counter for. The large-scale Soviet campaign involved the entire Soviet Government including Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov who in the period leading up to his fall in the autumn of 1957 increasingly appeared as a national icon and to a certain extent had reduced the influence of the Party on the armed forces. His dominating and confident appearance is discussed in the following text, with two CIA-reports about Marshal Zhukov from March and April 1957 as background. The two reports and the remainder of the Minister of Defense’s statements exemplify in a concise way the military-political discourse of the Khrushchev era with its contextually dependent shifts between deterrence, bluff, reassurance, planning considerations and internal discussion.
2. The CIA reports and their background
The two CIA Information Reports of 29 March and 30 April 1957 respectively, which are being published here for the first time, are released under the CIA Historical Review program.  We have, by request, had the reports sent to us by the CIA Historical Department. The information in both cases stems from the middle of March 1957. The reports were shortly mentioned for the first time in the work Battleground Berlin. CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (1997). 
The CIA Information Report of 29 March 1957, for several reasons, holds a special role in the history of the Cold War. It can be seen as the only authoritative statement known at the time about Soviet considerations from around 1957 about developing a capacity to reach the English Channel in a pre-emptive strike already on the second day of a war, which means in reality a key element in the Soviet war planning of the period.
At the same time, the report enters the intelligence history of the Cold War as it – unintentionally – contributed to the exposure of one of America’s few agents in the Soviet military intelligence service in the 1950s, the Russian intelligence officer Lieutenant-Colonel Pyotr Semyonovich Popov, who delivered the information leading to the composition of the report. Despite the fact that only a few copies of the CIA report were circulated, it came into the possession of the KGB. Hereby, the Soviet intelligence service obtained concrete evidence that the Americans had an agent in East Berlin. During the subsequent spy hunt lasting several years, Popov was exposed, and in 1960 he was sentenced and executed. By all appearances it was the British intelligence officer George Blake who handed the CIA report over to the KGB. 
The content of the two reports is based on a speech given by the Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov to the Soviet military elite in East Germany during a visit in March 1957. He was in the GDR with Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko to sign a defense agreement (of 12 March 1957) with the East German Government.
By all appearances Popov was present when the speech was given. During interviews with the KGB investigator of that time, Zvezdenkov, it was brought out that Popov appeared on a list of the military personnel present during the speech. It is also an established fact that afterwards, the KGB initiated a large-scale hunt for “the mole".  This bears significance for the assessment of the value of the information: The speech was not a forgery, and there is much indication that Popov had rendered the main contents correctly. The American intelligence service, which in the report characterized the source as “reliable" did not doubt that the words of the Marshal had been reported correctly in the version from 29 March. At the same time, in the brief intelligence estimate, the possibility that the purpose of the speech had been to strengthen the morale of the troops in East Germany was pointed out.
Our purpose in this introduction is to bring out an interesting aspect of the speech’ history, by comparing it with the other version of the speech’ contents, which is found in the following CIA report of 30 April 1957. According to this report, certain elements of the Zhukov speech, along with other information about Zhukov’s visit, was transmitted to an unnamed Asian journalist by Yevgeny Petrovich Pitovranov who was in charge of the KGB department at the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst, East Berlin, and for a period provided the said journalist with information. The CIA, itself in contact with the journalist, subsequently obtained the information from him. In the CIA report it is said that the motivation and reliability of the journalist is not established, and that the accuracy of some of his former reports has been questioned. Furthermore, the report has it that the journalist was probably used as a channel for the spreading of Soviet propaganda material.
If our understanding is correct, we are thus in the rather unique situation that the CIA, shortly after Zhukov had given his speech, obtained both a reliable summary and the KGB propaganda version of the same speech. As for the first version the informer received his payment from the KGB in the shape of a bullet, as for the second he might have received a more viable currency. The existence of the two versions and a comparable analysis, in our opinion, serves as a further confirmation of the authenticity of the first version.
However interesting in itself, this becomes truly exciting when we take a look at the content of the two different versions. The comparison of the two texts and their different origin gives an interesting insight into the difference between Soviet military strategy and the practice of propaganda and disinformation. As we mentioned this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time that the two CIA reports are being published in their entirety and subjected to a comparative attempt at interpretation.
According to the two different summaries of the speech the main contents were, to a certain extent, the same. At the same time though, there is marked differences as well which can mainly be ascribed to the fact that the version transmitted by the KGB has been sanitized of sensitive information which would have been damaging or embarrassing for the Soviet side and which could have offended other members of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the differences must be seen as conditioned by a wish to give the KGB version special twist.
3. The two versions in comparison
In the following, light will be shed on differences as well as resemblances in the two versions, by opposing some of the central parts of the reports. The interpretation we present here is that the main purpose of the Popov version has been reassurance of the Soviet generals at the forces in East Germany, who were now facing a new Western force configuration in the shape of the new divisions of the Bundeswehr and the nuclear armament of the NATO defense, but that in spite of the unmistakable elements of pep-talking we are also presented with unique insights into main elements of the war planning that Zhukov himself was in charge of, while the KGB version presents us with a manipulated picture meant for propaganda purposes in the battle for the minds in Asia.
Not least, the difference between the two versions is due to the fact that the Popov version is building on the premise that sensitive military relations could be openly discussed.
In each of the boxes below, the headlines in each row have been added by us, to emphasize what matters we wish to compare.
THE POPOV VERSION
29 March 1957
THE KGB VERSION
30 April 1957
Future capability: At the Channel within (46 hours +) two days.
Zhukov declared that the Soviet army is so strong that it could achieve victory over its enemies in a very short time. He said that the strategic and tactical doctrines under which the GSFG operates are obsolete, and that operations must now be planned so that Soviet forces will reach the English Channel on the second day of war.
Existing capability: Strong superiority in tanks. Able to reach the Channel within two days, almost without battle.? We already have enough tanks in the GDR to overrun Western Europe up to the French coast without much opposition. We do not want many tanks now. If war comes, our tanks will be on the French coast within 48 hours. There will be practically no fight.
Only the American air force is a credible opponent. The U.S. allies are without significance. Black American soldiers will not fight against us.
The only people who can fight us are the Americans. On land the Americans will not be able to resist us. The Americans know this well, but in the air they will fight. Every third French soldier is a communist and sympathizes with the USSR. We do not care for other soldiers. American Negroes will not fight against us. We have sounded their minds in various ways. There are many Negro soldiers in West Berlin, and many of them are our good friends and our friends visit them regularly.
No modernization of the GSFG. New equipment is out of the question.When asked why the GSFG was not armed with the newest equipment, Zhukov replied that this was unnecessary because the present equipment is adequate for the tasks assigned to the GSFG; the issue of new military equipment to the GSFG is out of the question, because re-equipping these forces would arouse unnecessary reaction in the West, and Western agents in Germany are observing the Soviet forces from every house.
All ground forces will soon be armed with the latest nuclear weapons, and their mobility is to be increased with new equipment.
Emphasis will be given to preparing land forces to face atomic warfare. Soviet land forces should have atomic weapons. Commanders will change over to atomic artillery from conventional artillery. This will take place soon and the entire land force will be equipped with the latest atomic weapons.
He asked the commanders to mechanise their infantry with the latest weapons and transport facilities so that the army could be deployed and move quickly.
Soviet pre-emptive strike. Not necessarily use of nuclear weapons.In the event that the Western powers should suddenly unleash a war, the GSFG must hold out for forty-six hours, because that is the period during which the second echelon of Soviet troops will move up, equipped with all types of modern weapons. The second echelon will have the responsibility for offensive action, and the experience gained in moving troops into Hungary indicates that it will require forty-six hours to deploy the second echelon.
Zhukov emphasized the fact that the Soviets will definitely be the ones to start the war, in order to take advantage of the factor of surprise. As soon as it is apparent that Western forces are preparing to unleash a war, the Soviets must beat them to the punch.
First-use of nuclear weapons. Extended deterrence. No pre-emption.Zhukov called on the commanders to be vigilant regarding West Germany and to keep their divisions ready for counterattack. He said that any attack on the GDR would be immediately followed by an atomic counterattack.
Certain problems between Eastern “allies",Zhukov asserted that mutual respect must be maintained between the GSFG and the GDR “People’s Army", but that strict security measures must be maintained by the Soviet Army in regard to the GDR army.
Certain Soviet units have permitted GDR army personnel to learn too much about Soviet army equipment and techniques.
Soviet personnel must not trust Germans, since GDR army volunteers have been known to flee to the West after their military service was completed.
Emphasizing the need for closer co-operation between the Soviet and East German armies.Zhukov visited East German army installations and asked that East German military personnel be sent to the USSR for training in atomic warfare.
He emphasized the need for closer relations between the East German Army and the Soviet Army for the purpose of defeating the imperialists.
The Soviet Union holds the necessary strength.As soon as it is apparent that Western forces are preparing to unleash a war, the Soviets must beat them to the punch.
Emphasizing the unity and strength of the Warsaw Pact.He told both East German and Soviet commanders that the East German army and the Czechoslovak army as well as the Soviet army will play the most important role in smashing their enemies.
In both versions of the speech, focus was on the capability of the Soviet land forces to overrun Western Europe but still it is quite different scenarios, which are being presented in the Popov summary of the speech and in the propaganda/disinformation version. This will appear from the following analysis.
4. Zhukov’s speech (the Popov version)a. Pre-emption
The East, according to the Popov version, will strive to strike first in a situation of war (pre-emption), and thus attention is given to the element of surprise including the possibility of launching the attack at night or on a holiday.
Zhukov’s statements in the closed circle of his fellow countrymen in Berlin must be seen as a further indication that the Soviet Union had taken over the pre-emption strategy that the U.S. had already adopted in 1950 (NSC-68). It was Zhukov who, in 1955 exerted pressure on the editors of the classified military journal Voennaia Mysl’ to print the article about surprise in modern warfare, written by Marshal P. Rotmistrov. In this, it was said that “it is the obligation of the Soviet armed forces not to permit a surprise attack on our country and, if this is attempted, not just to repel the attack but to carry out a counterattack or even a pre-emptive attack of frightful devastating force".  It seems likely that Zhukov was also involved when the journal in a leading article from May 1955 elaborated on this matter, writing: “The task is to work out seriously all sides of this question [of surprise] and above all to elaborate ways and means of warning of surprise attack by the enemy and of dealing to the enemy preemptive blows on all levels – strategic, operational, tactical". 
Details on nuclear strategies were among the most well guarded military information. It was knowledge reserved for a few key figures. Thus, it is of no surprise that Zhukov in a speech recently found in the Central Military Archives in Prague, which he delivered at a conference on military science in May 1957 expressed himself more carefully: “Some people accentuate that our strategy should be organized in a way as to foresee a system of sudden pre-emptive strikes with the purpose of frustrating a strike under preparation by the adversary. This is not to be spoken of openly". 
A more blurred mention is found in three subsequent editions of Marshal Sokolovskii’s Voennaya Strategiia (from 1962, 1963 and 1968). But there is hardly any doubt that the most important principle in the Soviet military doctrine of the time was “frustrating a nuclear surprise attack by the enemy and taking the strategic lead at the very beginning of war" as it was written in 1963 – however also in the classified Soviet military journal – by Colonel-General Lomov in an article on Soviet military doctrine.  Not until the second half of the 1960’s did the Soviet perception of the initial stage of war begin to change. This was due to the establishment of a silo-based second-strike capability by which the need for pre-emption was not seen to be as necessary as in the previous period.
Zhukov can be said to have expressed the pre-emption strategy in the most clear and direct form known to us, and by the irony of fate it was just this fierce unmistakable wording which – as probably the only one of the cited remarks about pre-emption – came to be known in Western circles of military intelligence shortly after he had given his speech. Thus, it is truly a unique document.
Furthermore, it is ironic that the formation of those special units (Spetsnaz) which Zhukov had set up with an eye to – within the framework of the pre-emption strategy – launching surgical strikes against the Western nuclear forces, would be used to overthrow him.
Khrushchev made a point of attack of this when he and those of his opinion chose to overthrow Zhukov on charges of “Bonapartism" in October 1957, as the Minister of Defense was accused – on an entirely untenable basis – of having established the school affiliated with the special units with the intention of carrying out a coup d’etat. It was not done in a particularly elegant way, but it reflected an adjustment of the power balance between Party and army to the advantage of the party. The Party had fought back and marked that it would not tolerate important military decisions being withheld from it. 
b. The operational aspect
In his speech, Zhukov shortly embarked upon the subject of his recent visit to India (the Soviet Union wished to strengthen India militarily against the Western ally, Pakistan) and Burma. The main part of the speech, however, concerns the military-strategic picture as it was outlined in Europe in 1957, seen through Soviet spectacles. It is not hard to understand that the US military intelligence interpreted the speech as an attempt to strengthen morale among the officer corps. The content is characterized by a number of not overly balanced reflections on the quality of the Soviet forces compared with those of the different adversaries. The Soviet troops received praise for their mobility and fighting capabilities during the Hungarian uprising where, during the initial drawing together, they allegedly covered a distance of 400 km in 24 hours. This experience was apparently an important part of the background for the presented view that the 2nd Echelon (from White Russia and the Baltic area) could be brought into action after a 46-hour march from the garrison areas.
Zhukov’s choice of words indicates that he felt a need to calm some concern among the generals at the forces in East Germany. What exactly conditioned this concern is not clear, but most likely it was due to the conventional (the future new divisions of the Bundeswehr) and nuclear strengthening of the NATO defense – in any case dissatisfaction among the generals with the fact that the forces in East Germany did not become equipped with the newest weapons (that is: the newest nuclear weapons) can be detected. In his answer, Zhukov seems to have passed lightly over a question about the subject as he claims that the introduction of new nuclear weapons would provoke an unnecessary reaction from the West. This was hardly a satisfactory answer inasmuch as the West had clearly initiated an arms build-up in shorter-range nuclear weapons. Probably, the real background is the fact that the Soviet Union was lacking far behind the West and did not have the possibility of deploying the weapons spoken of in the Soviet propaganda. The Soviet forces in East Germany were not equipped with tactical and operational missiles until the beginning of the 1960’s.
Of main interest though is the assessment that the speech contains of the doctrines for bringing the Soviet forces in East Germany (GSFG) into action in the case of a war. It is said that the strategic as well as the tactical doctrines are obsolete, and blitzkrieg operations had to be planned in order to reach the Channel on the second day of war. As Zhukov proposes strongly offensive operations one must eo ipso conclude that the existing war plans of 1957 seemed to him to be defensive or only moderately offensive. To what extent the Marshal’s words reflect actual discussions within the military and political elite cannot be decided on the present basis. Merely, it has to be noted that the Soviet war planning of the 1960’s was based on those highly offensive drives towards the Channel that Zhukov was advocating in 1957. Moreover it is clear that in Zhukov’s statements in this military forum, large-scale operations of conventional forces continue to take a leading part. In the KGB version of the Minister of Defense’s statements with regard to deterrence and propaganda (cf. below, in his 20 March speech) a different accentuation of the role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare can be detected.
The best armed forces on the Eastern side are, according to Zhukov, the Soviet 2nd Echelon forces, which are to push forward from the Baltics and White Russia in 46 hours. These forces are to be in charge of the actual offensive into Western Europe. In this version, the GSFG almost has a buffer function, while waiting for the core units.
If the West should succeed in staging a surprise attack, it is the task of the GSFG to hold the aggressor off for the 46 hours it will take to bring forward the 2nd Echelon.
The same explicit emphasis has been not been put on nuclear weapons in Zhukov’s commentary as in the propaganda/disinformation version. This is somewhat in opposition to the general understanding of the literature on Soviet military thinking. According to this understanding it was an element in the Soviet military doctrine up until about 1965, and thus the official understanding, that a war between East and West would inevitably be an overall nuclear war.  As early as before the fall of Khrushchev, limited nuclear and purely conventional options appear as a possibility. It is obvious that these options are the ones that Zhukov attaches importance to when facing his military colleagues and his line can probably be taken as an indication that he did not unconditionally share Khrushchev’s views on the character of a future major war.
Seen this way, the Zhukov speech constitutes a caveat against a too schematic view on the military doctrine of the 1950’s and on Russian thoughts about Western plans. This remark, however, should not be perceived in a way as to say that we rule out the use of nuclear weapons during the already described advance towards the Channel. As a series of articles in Voennaia Mysl’ on the use of nuclear weapons in the beginning of the 1960’s seems to show, at that time, the Soviet officers may have possibly had a pretty weak understanding of the difficulties the use of nuclear weapons would bring about for their own advance.  In this case it would, obviously, increase the possibility that the weapons would be used.
Our last comment on the authentic plan begins with a question: did Zhukov himself seriously believe that the 2nd Echelon could sweep through Eastern and Central Europe and reach the Zone frontier in Germany in 46 hours? To us, this does not sound very likely and one must ask oneself if the reassurance factor could perhaps be at work as well. He had to reckon with the possibility that such a massive and quick movement could be met with considerable Western counter-measures very quickly after its initiation. After all, his presentation did not take as its point of departure an imminent Western attack, so it does not make much sense to imagine that the Western forces would not be prepared for the situation. But if it is difficult to imagine that he himself should have faith in this version of his plan, would it not, with unrelenting logic, mean that we place emphasis upon his remarks about the soft Western lifestyle and Westerners’ propensity for relaxing in weekends and on holidays? On such occasions it would be favorable to launch an attack, he says. Among other things, that idea was put into practice at the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which was being launched while President Johnson was away on holiday.  But maybe we have now moved a bit from the pre-emption and moved a step closer to preventive warfare. Is this statement in reality what the Zhukov speech holds? Considering what great emphasis was put on the element of surprise by Soviet writers, this is not unimaginable. For instance, V. Ye. Savkin’s “Basic Principles of Operational Arts and Tactics" which, however, concerns the non-strategic level has it that:
"The effect of the principle of concentration is closely interwoven with the principles of mobility, activeness and surprise. The strength of the attack and swiftness and surprise of actions are of decisive importance and characteristic of the principle of concentration under contemporary conditions. This desire for surprise permeates all decisions involved in the preparation for and conduct of operations; the operational goals, direction and time of the attack, forces and weapons to be employed, and methods of operations must be unexpected for the enemy." 
Another, less probable interpretation of the 46-hour movement in the Zhukov plan shall not go completely unmentioned: It could be ranged in the line of somewhat empty statements in the style of Georgii Malenkov on the 20th Party Congress where he declared that a third world war would “lead to the total collapse of the capitalist system". 
5. The KGB version (the propaganda/disinformation version)
According to the KGB version, reaching the Channel on the second day of war is presented as an actual, existing capability and so is carrying out the operation in one movement directly from the grounds of the barracks. The NATO defense is completely downgraded and some respect can only be detected when it comes to the mentioning of the American Air Force. Concentration of troops or the 2nd Echelon is not spoken of in this version.
In this version, West strikes first and East immediately retaliates with nuclear weapons. Emphasis is put on the nuclear capability and, in reality, a nuclear doctrine about first-use is declared, which was not in accordance with the majority of the Soviet statements at the time. The nuclear deterrence is also valid when it comes to attacks on the GDR and is thus extended to all European areas under Soviet control. The very explicit language about the nuclear character of the war is completely absent from the Popov version.
The contrast between the scenarios in the two versions can hardly be any greater.
The target audience for the KGB version must, as mentioned, be assumed to have been the public opinion in the third world and maybe especially the neutral regimes in Asia and Africa who at this very time where the object of wooing from the Soviet Government.  The long-term goal for Khrushchev was to break through the American base system by creating a “zone of peace" consisting of the communist and non-aligned states. The year 1956 was marked by the preparations for the “Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference" arranged by leading communist organizations, which was held in Cairo in December 1957.
The KGB version can – with its references to the racial discrimination in the United States (the mention of the friendship between the Russians and the Afro-American soldiers) – be fitted into this frame without difficulties. The overall goal of the propaganda effort probably was to overcome hesitations in the third world about co-operation, by presenting an image of the overwhelmingly superior military strength of the Soviet Union, of her abilities to protect her friends and of her readiness to supply weapons and military education.
Whether or not the message in the wording presented here has reached the target audience can only be established by a closer investigation of the Soviet propaganda activities in this part of the world.
At the end it deserves a remark, that when Marshal Zhukov himself made a public appearance at this time it was on a selected scene, and as the presenter of the Soviet declaratory politics. A direct address to the world public and not least the USA was undertaken by the Marshal on 20 March immediately after his return from East Germany and the day after the opening of the Disarmament Conference in London. In a well-staged speech in the House of the Army in Moscow – which was circulated by the TASS and held in the presence of six marshals – he made it clear that the nuclear weapons – unless altogether banned – in the near future would increasingly come to replace the conventional weapons. In a major war they would inevitably be brought in as the main instrument of destruction. And the Americans would not, as in previous wars, be able to avoid a crushing blow at the other side of the ocean. Here, it was the member of Government more than the organizing military man speaking and the aim was twofold: to exert influence on a frightened European – especially German – public and to invalidate all American notions that a nuclear war could be limited to Europe only. 
SVEND AAGE CHRISTENSEN is Chief of Analysis at the Danish Institute for International Affairs (DIIS) in Copenhagen. He is currently in charge of the Institute's Cold War Study Program. From the University of Copenhagen he got his Ph.D. on Russian diplomatic history.
FREDE P. JENSEN is a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Affairs (DIIS) in Copenhagen. He is Dr.phil. from the University of Copenhagen and has specialized in Scandinavian diplomatic and military history and the security politics of the Cold War era.
 CIA Information Report, 29 March 1957. Subject: "Zhukov Address". Central Intelligence Agency Historical Review Program (CIA-HRP); CIA Information Report, 30 April 1957. Subject: “Zhukov Comments on Soviet Military Capabilities". CIA_HRP.
 Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey (1997): Battleground Berlin. CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, p. 271-74.
 Cf. Battleground Berlin p. 272.
 Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey (1997): Battleground Berlin. CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, pp. 268ff, 488ff.
 Rotmistrov, P. (1955): “O roli vnezapnosti v sovremennoi voine" (On the role of surprise in modern war), Voennaia Mysl’, No. 2, 1955, p. 21 (Cited after Kokoshin, Andrei A. (1998): Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91, Cambridge, Mass. & London: The MIT Press, p. 123.
 Garthoff, Raymond L. (1958): Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, 1958, p. 85. G23.454.8 Ga
 Zapiski iz vystupleniia Marshala Zhukova na nauchnoi konferencii, Mai 1957 g. 11 pp., p. 4 (MNO/SM, 1957, box 16, sig. 4/1-1, Central Military Archives, Prague). Special thanks to Petr Luňák who found the document, and to Vojtech Mastny for drawing our attention to it and providing it.
 Lomov, N. (1963): “Sovetskaia voennaia doktrina" (Soviet Military Doctrine), Voennaia Mysl’, No. 1, p. 21; cited after Kokoshin (1998), p. 122f.
 Chaney, Otto Preston (Rev. ed. 1996): Zhukov, p. 454f.
 Garthoff, Raymond L. (1990), Deterrence and Revolution in the Soviet Military Doctrine, p. 52.
 Friedman, Norman (2000): The Fifty-Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War, London: Chatham Publishing, p. 215. The relevant issues if the secret journal Voennaia Mysl’ had been handed over to a Western intelligence service by Colonel Oleg Penkovskii. However, Raymond L. Garthoff widely used the journal while preparing his book from 1958 (Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, s. 256).
 Vigor, P.H. (1983), Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, p. 159.
 Savkin, V. Ye. (1974): Basic Principles of Operational Arts and Tactics, USAF "Soviet Military Thought" Series, pp. 227, 234; cited after Douglass, Jr., Joseph D. (1980): Soviet Military Strategy in Europe, New York: Pergamon Press, p. 46.
 XX s’ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (1956) (20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow: Politizdat, p. 432; cited after Kokoshin (1998), p. 115.
 The target audience does not, in this context, seem to have been the public opinion in West Europe. On going over Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from the months March to July 1957 several statements by Zhukov can be found – usually under big headlines – but nothing that resembles the KGB version.
 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 21 March 1957. Likewise in Pravda 20 March 1957.