Preparing for War: The Strategic Doctrine
Q: Did we have in the art of war and planning our own thoughts; did we retain some general guidelines regarding strategy and the art of operation?
Gen. Siwicki: Our own ideas? If they are doctrinal determinations — such a doctrine is binding — it is in the entire Pact; then there are determinations such as how one carries out operations relating to armament, to the possibilities of the opposing side, to configuration of the terrain etc. — those are general determinations. They change depending upon doctrinal determinations — e.g., the question of the use of nuclear weapons. Then the assignments that were set for the army (whether it is Polish, Czech, or some other) it is general. One plans how the army will act in relation to the binding doctrine, or also the tactical-operational determinations — that depends upon the ability of the staff and the thinking of the commander who is commanding it. And of course it is a lie that some Ivan[1] said to us that this division goes here, and this one here, and you stay there. No, all of this we decided ourselves.
Q: I have here a completely sincere desire, because I would like to find out to what extent the Polish Army really had influence over doctrinal developments. Did we have some thoughts that the Soviet Army, for example, adopted? Or did we simply have to adopt theirs?
Gen. Siwicki: Of course, matters of strategic significance — the use of nuclear weapons, what doctrine to adopt at a certain stage of preparations for operations in conducting war — they were always put forth by the source that held the cudgel in its hands. At the same time, symposia were held, there were relevant staff deliberations, and views were presented there on this matter. Of course we, the Poles, were always valued in these matters because our activity resulted both from the Polish character and from our position in the Warsaw Pact. [Siwicki, pp. 12-13]
Gen. Siwicki: As a matter of priority, competence was sought for a better-organized offensive operation, with the synchronization of all types of armed forces and services. At the same time, defense was treated as compulsory. Both as time went by and the striking force of new weapons changed, the defensive and offensive proportions varied. There were periods when there was such a thought that everything could be taken care of: strike with nuclear weapons, open up a corridor, and even march 100 km a day. Later, in the seventies and eighties, much more attention was also devoted to defense. But it was always secondary in comparison to offensive operations. But in every maneuver defensive operations occurred. [Siwicki, p. 5]
Gen. Siwicki: Most of the time we conducted exercises in the northwest direction, but we also conducted exercises in the central direction.[2] All the exercises, which were a great many, contained certain elements of the operational plans since they were organized, after all, in order to prepare the staffs and commanders to act in a critical situation, when military efforts would have to be taken; at the same time, the goals of the exercises were never completely equivalent with the goal of the operational plan. In different exercises, there was a different range of those elements from the operational plan.[3] [Siwicki, p. 11]
Q: My question, general, is especially about the initial scenario [of NATO attack]. As a military man, didn’t you feel that something was not right? Why did they start the war? To give up the strategic initiatives already after three or four days?[4] Did that not seem strange to you? Did you agree with this scenario?
Gen. Jasiński: It seemed to us all that all these exercises with the release of atomic missiles — because they would have been released; one could read all of this between the lines. And the person who was a military man and oriented himself to all of this, he knew that war was impossible. Nuclear war was impossible because we would mutually annihilate each other. And the art relied simply on targeting the armaments. The one who was economically stronger would win. That’s where it ended up, that there was such a war. During the exercises, it was not speculated where the rockets would be launched. Who would detect it, because certain rocket mechanisms were made mobile, and one could not stop it. In our case too, as soon as we turned it on, there was no escape; we had to launch after a half hour. And the whole art relied upon my changing the place of their stationing when, in the course of this half hour, I found out that such preparations were happening on the Western side. And the Russians, too, thought up rockets on trains that traveled through all of the Soviet Union. The Americans, too, they were no dumber. Now, what would come from that, my dear gentlemen; the two sides would destroy each other. Imagine that today they drop leaflets on Warsaw: Tomorrow, a nuclear explosion will ensue, or after three days. What sort of panic would break out? Now, all the fairy tales about civil defense and about how we will defend ourselves against atomic weapons — they are just fairy tales. That’s how the military participating in all the maneuvers thought. [5][Jasiński, pp. 17-18]
Q: It began with a defensive assumption, but in your understanding was it not so that it was somehow ideologically set up for the sake of complying with a certain political conception that we were beginning from the defensive, but the essence, nevertheless, was an offensive.
Gen. Tuczapski: Of course, I would not want to tell you what I thought of it because it is not suitable for print. I, knowing the Soviets, if they had come to the conclusion at that time that war was unavoidable, I feared that they would not wait for the others to strike first. I feared that it would be that way. Knowing the way those gentlemen understood things. [Tuczapski, p. 14]
Poland’s Mission
Q: Did you have influence in the leadership of Ministry of National Defense on the choice of directions for the operations of the Polish Front? Did you have any influence over it, or was it simply a direction that was designated to be carried out? Could there have been a discussion?
Gen. Siwicki: When I joined the General Staff, there were operational plans. No changes were made to them later in a general sense, and there were no such considerations. There were improvements, changes resulting from new armaments, resulting from changes in doctrine for military operations. At the same time, we adapted both the organizational structure of the types of armies and services to carry out these tasks in case of war.
Certainly, before the operational plan for wartime was worked out, certainly the state leadership concurred in such and not some other use of our Front in operational plans. At the same time, in the “Statute for Wartime” that we signed in 1978, it is stated that one had to receive permission if the Commander of the Staff of the Theater wanted to use the Front — inconsistent with the provisions — that he had to receive the permission of the state authorities of Poland.
And of course they should both coordinate the reconnaissance work in the alliance and not only see their own interest, but they should also make their own contribution to the alliance. Not only in verbal form, that someone would say a few pretty words and that would be OK. No, there had to be coordination. [Siwicki, pp. 13-14]
Gen. Jaruzelski: It did not even have to do with some rules or prohibitions. It would have been simply difficult, and it would not have even been serious, to plan the operation of the Polish Front according to some sort of changing principles of strategy and operational art. In this circle, the problem of interoperability did not require clarification. The generals had to thus be united and were united. At the same time, realistically, we were alone. Every exercise, every fundamental solution brought a perceptible step forward in one’s own interpretation, based on the knowledge one possessed, innovations, actual needs and possibilities. Summing up, we were able to maintain not only the fundamental national attributes within the external Front, but also full sovereignty and originality of solutions in the area of the internal Front. [Jaruzelski, p. 7]
Q: General, did I understand correctly that our Front would have been the second strategic echelon? I always thought that it was the second echelon of the first strategic echelon.
Gen. Skalski: You well understand why the first echelon was the armies in the GDR. How it would have been shifted — all types of exercises were conducted— roadways, train tracks, etc. Now then, our army advanced, their army advanced. But everything was regulated by us.
Q: Was it stated that the Front that was to be created from the Belorussian Military District, the Baltic, would have still advanced before our Front, still before our Pomeranian-Silesian Army?
Gen. Skalski: Not so. The entire first attack echelon was located in the GDR. And the second echelon, it was from Belorussia – in this case, from the side of Eastern Prussia, the Baltics, from Ukraine, and then from the Subcarpathian area. [Skalski, p. 7]
Q: And was the strengthening of our Front through non-national forces foreseen in the operational plans?
Gen. Barański: Absolutely. In the forward region of our front was a region reserved for the 11th Army — I remember it as if it were today — that would be formed from armies stationed in Kaliningrad oblast.
Q: It was to be the second echelon in our Front.
Gen. Barański: Well, that was like the revenge of the Supreme Commander of the Theater.
Q: But in the zone of our Front?
Gen. Barański: In the zone of our Front. Our division was completely pushed out by the Soviet army’s air transportation forces. [Barański, pp. 3-4]
Q: General, how did you assess at the time the direction of attack? Good for us, or not?
Gen. Barański: It was very difficult because it required first of all a concentrated attack, and after that it branched out.
Q: To the North and to the West.
Gen. Barański: Well, and the Elbe, which also is a powerful river. When I was on reconnaissance in the German Democratic Republic, and went through the Kiel Canal in the Polish naval training craft Gryf, I saw how at the mouth you could not see the other bank. [Barański, p. 3]
Q: It has been put into great doubt (it is not a political matter, but a military one) that the passage from South to North, the concentration somewhere in a belt of let’s say 200 or 350 km raised doubts, that the strategic movement raised doubts.
Gen. Tuczapski: One could practically only test it at the time when it would have set off. All assessments of a theoretical nature — for or against — they are [mere] assessments.
Q: Was there some sort of alternative?
Gen. Tuczapski: No, there was not an alternative because there could not have been. The second strategic echelon should have invaded Germany. The wisdom had to be based on the fact that a decision should have been made in such a way that the Polish Army and the three Districts on the western border of the Soviet Union would have marched out. What would have happened, I cannot say. It might have gotten tangled up, someone might have been late.
Q: Czechoslovakia showed that not everything would have turned out for them.
Gen. Tuczapski: Our army marched into Czechoslovakia splendidly.
Q: But they had problems.
Gen. Tuczapski: There was practically only the 24th Division, which came from Lvov. I do not know how they got there; I do not know how the Bulgarians got there. But I do know how Gen. Siwicki’s army went because I was in Legnica, and I helped him in a certain sense to move out.
Q: Old Clausewitz always wrote in his wise books that war is different than what we think.
Gen. Tuczapski: I do not want to answer for the Soviet Army, for the General Staff of the Soviet Army, because I do not know whether they had a sufficient plan, or not. It has to do with the plan changing, the one that was conceived in such a way that we should have attacked to the East, rather than the West? Impossible! Certain directions could be changed. The first variant was certainly that we would defend ourselves. It should be said that the Soviets never were the first to begin a war. It was the same during the maneuvers. [Tuczapski, pp. 12-13]
Q: What was the style of work in the Staff of the Unified Forces? What were its tasks?
Gen. Szklarski: The Staff of the Unified Armed Forces did not have any tasks associated with the preparation of plans or with the realization of operational tasks. All of this was done based on the directions from the national General Staffs — the national Staff of the Soviet Army. Recommendations regarding these plans in the northwest direction, about which it has often been spoken and written, came from the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Regarding these matters, I met with Akhromeev[6]; as Chief of Administration, I met with the First Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Administration. The Main Operational Administration had several other Administrations in its structure.
With regard to the Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, there were exclusively peacetime tasks, but they were of course associated with preparing the armies for functioning in wartime. What tasks were they? Well, then, there were the tasks of preparing operational training — above all else for the staffs and some sort of supervision there over the combat training of the armies. Organizational matters relating to mobilization — but not in the sense that there were general plans for the deployment of armies. The national armies did this; for the Soviet Army, the General Staff of the Soviet Army did this through its own structures.
At the same time issues of completion were managed in the staff — if it was stated that there was a Division 12? It is not in full battle readiness, but it should be at 80%. If it has to have such materiel in the course of the year, it had to have an influence upon that division, and all of this was recorded. Because the staff took part in the preparation and oversight over the realization of the five-year plans for the development of the armed forces. And of course all the additional tasks resulted from this.
These plans were made with the participation of the national armies. Whatever affected the Polish Army was made in our general staff. Comprehensive plans were completed there, but only Soviet officers were able to view the detailed comprehensive plans. Our officers were only able to view plans for the Polish Army. Yes, they were scattered throughout the entire staff, several of them were worked on in the operational administration, in reconnaissance, in different organs. And they were under the authority of the Soviet officers who directed those organs. But they were given access only and exclusively to materials relating to the Polish Army.
As an example, in these administrations were so-called directions: the western direction, the southwest direction — operational directions. And in them, under pressure, it was introduced — this was the most important office apart from the deputy chief of staff — that the chief of the western direction, for example, was a Russian, and his deputy was a Pole. In the southwest direction, it was a Hungarian. But if the chief of the western direction went on vacation, and he was the deputy, it did not matter. A Russian was quietly named, who would direct everything, and he [the Pole] unfortunately would not. [Szklarski, pp. 6-7]
Western Theater of Operations
Gen. Jasiński: One can speculate why a Supreme Command for the Theater of Military Operations was created. It was created, and Marshal Ogarkov was appointed to that position. After the famous incident with the Korean airplane[7], Ogarkov stepped down from the position of Chief of General Staff, and was appointed to the position of Supreme Commander for the Western Theater of Military Operations. The Northern Group and its command was transferred to Świdnica, and the Supreme Command installed itself in Legnica. It was a large command, numbering in my estimation several hundred people. And this Pentagon that was built and can be seen today in Legnica, was envisioned for a huge command. Ogarkov, despite everything, was held in esteem. He was held in esteem; he was, one should say, a wise man. He had an outstanding group in that command. One should say that those were experts of a higher order. At the same time, up to the end, the role of this command was not delineated, especially in peacetime. [Jasiński, p. 5]
Gen. Jaruzelski: A command was created with Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov at the top, with headquarters in Legnica (the command of the Northern Army Group was transferred to Świdnica). There were national deputies — from Poland, General Antoni Jasiński, with a corresponding team, plus 60 officers joining individual cells of command. It was significant that the decisions that were made, along with directives, were formulated with the participation of and reached the Polish front in practice through the Polish deputy commander.
This mechanism was tested in several exercises. Personnel matters, logistics, military justice, courts, remained exclusively under the management of the national command. In sum, it was always imperfect, but still significant progress was made in formulating coalition procedures. Earlier, we still had our own fabric of experiences, created over the years and decades. I underline the special role of the great front maneuvers of a strategic character. [Jaruzelski talk, pp. 6-7]
Gen. Siwicki: The Western Theater of Operations — that was Ogarkov. Later, it was the Southwestern, the Southern, the Far Eastern, etc. But we were not engaged in these, only in those two: the Western and the Southwestern. Then, that staff was entered into the system of command in wartime — that the Staff of the Unified Armed Forces was no longer operationally directing our Front, and the Staff of the Western Theater of Operations already came in, and with it, the function of deputy supreme commander of the Western Theater came into being. A Pole headed it — General Jasiński. In the staff there was also an operational group with means of communication, composed of various specialists.
Q: Did this staff have a specific field of activity?
Gen. Siwicki: Our front was operationally in the system of the Western Theater; at the same time, our national deputy in the staff participated in working out the decision. And he set the tasks for the commander of the Front. Not the supreme commander of the theater.
Then a personnel conflict ensued, because suddenly Kulikov became supreme commander without the possibility of commanding armies. Because every organizational group — whether it was the Front or corps, etc., from the various allied armies — entered into operational subordination to the command of the theater. In other words, the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces could only correct, maintain contact with the ministers of defense, the General Staff of a given state, but he could no longer lead these armies. [Siwicki, p. 8]
Notes
[1] Nickname for a Russian.
[2] See as an example the document on the exercise "Bizon-71", directed by Gen. Siwicki, which anticipated the surrender of the city of Hannover.
[3] See for example the documents on the exercises "Lato-67" [Summer-67] and "Burza" [Storm].
[4] See Operational Directive no. 002 of the Staff of the Maritime Front of 4 October 1961.
[5] For an example of nuclear strikes envisaged during the exercises, see List of Nuclear Strikes by Westerners of 24 January 1962 and Report concerning the Planning of Nuclear Strikes by Missile Forces of October 1961.
[6] Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 1984-88.
[7] The shooting down by Soviet Air Force of South Korean airliner, KAL 007, on 1 September 1983.
