Personalities: From Stalin's Prisoners to Communist Generals

Q: How did the taiga — and above all else, the conditions under which you found yourself, General, after 1941, after June — what impression did it leave upon you? What relationship to the Russian state did you have after these experiences?

Gen. Siwicki: Yes. In 1940, I was deported along with my mother. After my father's arrest we lost track of him; I do not know anything about what further adversities my father met. My mother, until the end of her life, never returned to the psychological norm.

Q: May I submit, General, that this stay in Russia left its imprint not only upon your mother's psyche, but also upon your thinking about the past?

Gen. Siwicki: That is a very interesting phenomenon. We young men who survived there, under those terrible, difficult conditions in the taiga, adopted a positive attitude toward the Russians. Because they were similar to us. They were living through poverty just the same, they were working just as hard. Those few who oversaw us did display contempt, and we had to listen to nasty words, but those were individual people with a pistol in their belt. Of course, later, as one matured, a person learned the mechanism of how the state functioned and about the decision makers who caused great tragedies for thousands of Poles. It was as if that was behind the fog, somewhere removed from us. [Siwicki, p. 1]

Gen. Jaruzelski: The front undoubtedly had a tremendous influence here. And paradoxically, Siberia — but not Siberia in its worst incarnation, but in the sense of the Siberians, the people. But above all else the front. I had very many superiors, and colleagues, and subordinates — Russians from there whom I retain until today in my memory, in my heart. Such a thing, after that, grew stronger in all these categories: struggle, imperialism, borders, the Oder-Neisse, and ultimately our position. [Jaruzelski, p. 12]

And later the creation of a chance to break away from the inhuman soil of the northern taiga, the acquisition of an officer's rank, [and] participation in the liberation and reconstruction of our fatherland, like a dream come true from my boyhood years. A people's state, the system of the time, also assured me in fact ample, relatively ample, living conditions and the possibility of an education. [And] later, the attainment of higher ranks. I think that all of this defined, influenced, shaped my views regarding the discharge of honest military service, and it shaped my devotion and loyalty to the people's state, with the deep conviction that I was truly serving ideals for the good of working people, for the freedom of our country, for the suffering Fatherland after the war. I think that all of this can be explained in such a way. I am unable to hate. [Siwicki, pp. 17-18]

Serving the Communist State

Q: And the state apparatus, which was a criminal apparatus? Did you put this sort of question to yourself?

Gen. Siwicki: Gradually, I matured and understood on which side there was evil, and where the good was. But this came about slowly, and I did not bear any hatred towards these people, the Russians and the representatives of the other nations of the Soviet Union because these people were truly good. And not only I evaluated them in such a way, but all of my colleagues with whom I spoke; they should have already long ago experienced a better life and [more] respect than they did. Besides, as I met them, I was ashamed that these people could not get what they deserved for their work and for their attitude toward life in those truly bad conditions. [Siwicki, p. 2]

Only after I achieved a high rank did I perceive that it was a mechanism that was inducing many criminal activities, injurious to many thousands of people. Still, on the other hand, it was a state with which we had friendly relations as a state when we were in the Warsaw Pact, [and] in that divided world, I thought that still, for the interests of Poland at the time, we should make use of the advantages for the only Poland that there was and proceed in a way that would bring advantages under the given conditions. [Siwicki, p. 2]

Gen. Szaciłło: My father came from Byelorussia. My father's parents had a large estate there. As kulaks in the thirties they were deported to Siberia, and all of them actually died there.

Q: General, how did your military advancement go, so that you reached the rank of Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration [GZP]?

Gen. Szaciłło: I completed officer school, and I was the commander of a mortar platoon. As commander of the mortar platoon, I was sent to a course for regimental chiefs of staff. I thus had the opportunity to advance from platoon commander to regimental chief of staff. For the first time, I experienced a little something of military knowledge and being in the army. And probably right away I stopped thinking about leaving.

Q: And when did that trampoline start in your career, sir? Excuse me — Deputy Chief of the GZP, then Chief of the Main Political Administration, and in the end Deputy Minister of National Defense.

Gen. Szaciłło: Well, just as in many cases here among the officer cadre of the Soviet army, I found myself in the Military-Political Academy. In '73, after my promotion, I went.

Q: And then you assumed the position of Deputy Chief of the GZP?

Gen. Szaciłło: Yes.

Q: Which bureau?

Gen. Szaciłło: Propaganda.

Q: How do you assess this propaganda work — naturally up to the level of the deputy chief — during the seventies? I understand one thing of course—Soviet models; what could you do, whether they attempted to direct this indoctrination in Poland, or whether, alternatively, it remained a sovereign field of activity?

Gen. Szaciłło There were higher, superior instances above the Main Political Administration — the party, the government. After my arrival at the GZP, the program for training officers, in which there was one topic: Marxism-Leninism, about that topic in all of these areas, whether it was termed philosophy, economics, or politics.

Q: You were a trained and believing Marxist then, or did you view it as a certain kind of duty?

Gen. Szaciłło That is, I considered myself a Marxist, but I would not want to utilize this category of believing Marxist, which one associates with a believing Catholic. I was not such a thing. I never felt very strong in economics. It was as difficult as it could be to read Lenin.

Q: How, when you found yourself in your leadership position as Head of the GZP, or as vice minister, or the approval of the material, that you then transmitted below? Was there some sort of unified conception on the scale of the Warsaw Pact?

Gen. Szaciłło In the military structures, in contrast to the section[s] for training and armament, [and] engineering, there were no recommendations.

Q: The party organs influenced you, the direction of your ideological work? Was there cooperation?

Gen. Szaciłło If there were such limitations, then they resulted more from a sort of — what I would call — self-control. [Szaciłło, pp. 1-5]

Q: I think that the choice that stood before you, General, or before all of you was principally as follows: That either one was a desperado, or one maintained one's reason in this matter and did not take such extreme gambles.

Gen. Drzewiecki: Well, above all else, one should not play dirty tricks. I have at least in this regard clean hands, that I never played dirty tricks on people. And I could have, because — it would be difficult not to admit that I was a member of the Party and was for a certain period of time the Secretary of the party committee of the General Staff. Perhaps I tried to rehabilitate myself with that memorandum. I do not know to what extent I succeeded.

Q: My question was not meant to accuse you. Of course, the doctrinal assumptions were one way and not the other, and it had to do with that type of response.

Gen. Drzewiecki: We believed in it. We were not compelled by force; we believed in it. [Drzewiecki, pp. 12-13]

The Soviet Command

All of them were people trained in the Second World War. And changing the conception of these people regarding how the military structure of the army should look was not so easy. A change in attack, some very powerful nuclear or non-nuclear or air attacks, some sort of quick raids — they could not get it into their heads. They had attacks, tanks, breakthroughs, artillery preparations, and went ahead. That thousands of people would perish, that was nothing. It did not matter. To them, the human being did not count. [Tuczapski, p. 21]

Marshal Rokossovskii. Rokossowski was a great gentleman. He never condescended to any level. He kept a large distance in relationship to everyone, not just to the youngest ranks. The distance was such that one should have respect. He was a very polite, courteous person. He never raised his voice. In terms of operations, he was up to the mark. [Drzewiecki, p. 7]

Marshal Grechko. Very meritorious, a sort of warm manner. At the same time he was a very professionally prepared commander, but also with the baggage of experience, which of course is not always serviceable for a new scenario of potential war. But he was a thinking person in the strategic sense, within the limits of those principles that we all — with a certain screwing up of one's eyes—accepted then. And he had the strongest political position in comparison with the others; he had good relations with Khrushchev, and one felt that he naturally had some leeway when he spoke about political matters. He was very tactful and understanding of our particular conditions. [Jaruzelski, p. 41]

He was a person who could be very nice, but I know that he could also be a cad towards the officers. All of them were such that they assumed a very severe attitude in relation to their subordinates. In contrast, they acted very well towards us. [Tuczapski, p. 21]

Marshal Iakubovskii. Marshal Iakubovskii was simple in manner. Not complicated in terms of his thinking and opinions. But at the same time he was open to contacts and to an exchange of views with allies. At the same time, towards officers of the Soviet Army he was at times even brutal. Less affable, very simple-minded and often rude, although not severe in expressing opinions in dealing with allies — I am speaking about the Polish officers. [Siwicki, p. 14]

He was some soldier. Quite simple, to put it delicately. [Jaruzelski, p. 41]

Marshal Kulikov. Kulikov was probably somewhere in the middle between Grechko and Iakubovskii. In the sense that his strategic caliber was certainly somewhat closer to Grechko's, but [in terms of] a certain cultural primitivism, let us call it, he was closer to Iakubovski. When everything was "normal," Kulikov did not feel like doing anything except what derived from the functioning of the Pact, the approval of protocols, or some sort of exercise. [Jaruzelski, p. 43]

He was an open person, who enjoyed making friends and was very interested in contact. He probably passed on the worst duties that he had to carry out to Gribkov in keeping with the principle — as it is often said in the army — that the chief of staff is there to carry out what the commander does not know, does not want to do, or is uncomfortable for him. [Siwicki, p. 14]

Gen. Gribkov. He was a person thinking in modern terms, unequivocal in defending the imperial goals of the Soviet Union; conversely, he ordered us to not make any concessions, because every concession threatens the surrender of power. [Siwicki, p. 21]

Gribkov was dry in his manner, unyielding, but correct in a diplomatic sense. He always defended very strongly the proposals of the staff of the Unified Armed Forces, even if they were unacceptable. Although in the end, corrections were made, his inflexibility and form of seeking out arguments, these were difficult to shake, this was his normal manner. He never made friends socially. [Siwicki, p. 14]

That was a different character. That fellow was unfriendly in his contacts, at times brutal in his statements, very importunate, especially at the time when martial law was being prepared. He was the fellow who tried the most to be firm here and was the most aggressive in that regard. [Jasiński, p. 11]

Gribkov, he was a Great Russian, of course with his nose turned up; on vsio znaet [Russian: 'he knew everything'], and that was it. [Barański, p. 7]

Marshal Ogarkov. He was a person of whom I have a very high opinion; very intelligent. An architect by profession, he was not a professional officer; he was an officer in the reserves, but one of the best-known and wisest people among the Soviet generals. [Tuczapski, p. 7]

Marshal Ustinov. Rather patriarchal. A little bit fatherly in his outlook. There was something good-spirited about him. And especially at times when he was constantly ordering us to make a certain purchase of weapons via licenses or to purchase finished weapons that we considered too "over the hill" because they [the Soviets] already had newer solutions. He would say then: See, soon the Arrow 10 will be "coming"; see what a weapon it is, why don't you want to buy it? And then at every exercise he would ask, he wanted to finally convince me.

We did not buy the Arrow 10. [Siwicki, p. 15]

Q: Did you not have the conviction, Sir, based on your contacts with the Soviet generals and marshals, that something there—that something in general in your leadership — that something reeked there?

Gen. Tuczapski: We knew how Brezhnev looked, we knew how Chernenko looked, we knew all of this. Then, there arose an unanticipated friendship between Jaruzelski and Gorbachev. Because suddenly a person appeared who started to think differently. I am not saying that he thought in the same categories as us. But he was a new person. Beyond that, Ogarkov, for example — yes, there were those kinds of people.

Q: But the executive power, in terms of competencies, that was Ustinov. And earlier there were several terribly hard, Stalinist breed of people.

Gen. Tuczapski: The majority were that way, unfortunately. [Tuczapski, p. 22]

Gen. Jaruzelski: All of them that we had to deal with, including the commander-in-chief, and not only ministers—it was like an amen to a prayer; every discussion ended with: "kak Leonid Il'ich skazal." As Comrade Brezhnev stated, as Comrade Brezhnev said. Not the Politburo, but quite personally — Leonid Il'ich. It was a certain stereotype, some external one, I would say, a certain skin, a certain shell, from beneath which it was sometimes difficult to glimpse a person of a different scale, which would appear with some sort of understanding that went beyond the stereotype defined by Politburo decisions and general doctrine.

In relation to their Soviet subordinates, they [the generals] held them in contempt; thus, such insulting epithets: "durak, shto ty tam" ["idiot, what are you doing there?" In relation to us, to our generals, there wasn't anything like that. It was probably encoded there, that they should not do that because it could be a problem. In addition, the view was constantly functioning that it was internationalism after all, it was friendship, it was Marxism-Leninism. [Jaruzelski, p. 43]