Introduction to Paweł Piotrowski's Article on Polish Military Plans and Exercises, by Frede P. Jensen
Paweł Piotrowski's article 'Landing in Denmark' appeared in June 2002 in the Polish weekly 'Wprost'. It has been translated from Polish by Maya Latynski. The publication takes place simultaneously on the websites of The Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) and The Danish Institute of International Affairs (DIIS). The article reflects the fact that access to Polish military archives has improved slightly in recent years, although the situation in this regard is still much better in other former Warsaw Pact countries.
It is not new knowledge that during the Cold War Poland was preparing for military operations against Denmark in case of an armed confrontation between East and West. Polish officers have confirmed this fact after the end of the Cold War. The Wrocław historian Paweł Piotrowski has gathered information on this topic in Polish literature, and has complemented it with new details in his articles "The Polish Maritime Front after the Second World War" (Polish title: "Front Polski (Nadmorski) po II Wojnie Światowej") and the smaller "Landing in Denmark" (Polish title: "Desant na Danię"), in the journal Wprost / 23 June 2002).
The article is primarily covering the period of time from 1956 to 1970. From Piotrowski's sources, however, it appears that already in 1950 a Polish military exercise presumed the so-called "liberation" of Denmark.
What is interesting in Piotrowski's article is the description of how circles around Party Secretary Władysław Gomułka, in trying to affirm Poland's sovereignty, developed the idea of a special Polish front. Accepted by the Soviet Union in 1961, it was subsequently incorporated into the operative planning of the Warsaw Pact as the Maritime Front. The consolidation of military co-operation that took place within the Warsaw Pact after 1960 shows that the Soviet Union had overcome its mistrust of Gomułka, which in 1956 had nearly resulted in Soviet military intervention in Poland.
In the article, the author distinguishes between "operational plans," "plans," and "exercises". In this distinction the latter are used to illustrate "the plans". The chains of command and the role of Russians and Poles in planning and operations are dealt with in the recent publication of a series of interviews with Polish generals.
Finally, what is thought-provoking, are the considerations of general Duszyński about the use of nuclear weapons against Danish cities, aiming to create panic in Denmark, amongst other purposes, and in that way force a quick Danish withdrawal from an international conflict.
It must be kept in mind that all this was a matter of military planning - i.e. of possible action. The presented material reveals parts of the conceptions of the Polish military, but very little of the plans' possibility to succeed. It gives certain clues to WHAT the Poles had in mind in case of a confrontation, but not IF or WHEN or WHY an attack would have been launched. On this background alone one can of course discuss capabilities and preparations, but hardly say anything about the risk of an attack.
Frede P. Jensen, Danish Insitute of International Affairs (DIIS)
