A Romanian Point of View about the Hot Days of October 1962: The Military Exercises Performed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Poland, East Germany, and Romania
The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on 14 May 1955 represented a highly significant event in the dynamic of the Cold War. Following the official emergence of a USSR-led political-military alliance on the European continent, the existing tensions between the superpowers of the time, the USA and the USSR, as well as between the European states divided by the Iron Curtain deepened.
For the political and military leaders of the states within the socialist camp, the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was not a surprise. The organizational, doctrinal and logistical standardisation of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces began as early as 1951. The Soviet military model imposed by Josef Stalin at “The Conference of representatives of the people's democratic states” (Moscow, 9-12 January 1951) was enforced in all those countries between 1951 and 1954. As soon as the Warsaw Treaty Organization was officially established in May 1955, the plan of creating Soviet-like armed forces in every member state of that alliance entered a new phase.
Being a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization implicitly generated certain obligations. All the states of the alliance had to participate in any military confrontation in which the Red Army was involved, both in Europe and in North America. However, such a situation was highly dangerous for the countries, except the USSR, as they could have got unwillingly involved in a military conflict generated by the struggle for global supremacy between the two superpowers of the time, the USSR and the USA.
Romania's inclusion on the list of WTO's founding states was not a surprise. Soviet troops had been stationed in Romania since 1944, and in 1951 the Romanian political and military leaders were enforcing the Soviet standards in the Romanian armed forces, according to the program which Josef Stalin had imposed.
The chances which occurred within the Romanian armed forces immediately after the departure of the Soviet troops from Romania in 1958 did not affect the essence of the relations between the authorities in Bucharest and the signatory states to the Warsaw Treaty. We can notice that the Romanian Communist leaders never declared publicly and officially their intention to withdraw Romania from the structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Their interest in being members of the organisation did not necessarily lie in maintaining “the monolithic unity of the socialist states” – an ideal which was known to be unreachable –, but in keeping their own power. The heated debates between the Romania communists and the Soviet leaders – politicians, diplomats, militaries or economists – were not over changing the political-ideological system in Romania. This might have been one of the main reasons why the Kremlin did not intervene brutally in Romania in the 1960s, as it had done, for example, in Hungary in autumn 1956.
However, the importance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for Romania is not reduced to maintaining certain political leaders in power. In the early 1960s, Marshal Vasilii Danilovich Sokolovskii (b. 1897 – d. 1968), together with a group of Soviet theorists, defined the type of strategic action which was to be taken by the Red Army if an international military conflict burst. The Soviet Marshal promoted the strategic offensive as the main course of action for the USSR's army. The offensive was to be unleashed at the very beginning of the generalised conflict in order to avoid the damage which the military operations at home (including here the territories of the WTO members, allies of the Soviet Union) were likely to cause.
Moreover, the Soviet Marshal stated the new means to be used by the Red Army in order to carry out the objectives of their military strategy: “Now, the main role will be played by the troops of strategic destination missiles, the long-range aircraft and the nuclear submarines equipped with missiles. All these structures will use the nuclear weapon if the Soviet Union is forced to resort to it. On the other hand, it is difficult to call the strikes of the missiles offensive or defence actions. The actions of the missile troops will always be decisive and on no account defensive, no matter if the troops attack or defend themselves on the land front”. In other words, the offensive unleashed with nuclear vectors was followed by the occupation of the enemy states' territories by the Soviet conventional forces. At the same time, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii declared against carrying out defensive strategic actions, as follows: “The Soviet army has to study defence, to know how to put it into practice in order to master all the forms of military action. However, what we have in mind is the operational and tactical defence. As regards the strategic defence and the defensive strategy, they must be firmly rejected as being extremely dangerous for the country” [1] .
It was the authorities in Moscow who initiated the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and was its supreme leaders. As a direct consequence, the WTO military maneuvers in the early 1960s were carried out in accordance with the global military strategy of the Soviet Union, drawn up by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii.
The first examples in this respect are the double-action troop's maneuvers, led by the Polish Minister of People's Defence, Colonel-General Marian Spychalski (b. 1906 – d. 1980). [2] Bearing the code name “BALTIC-ODER” [3] , the military exercise took place on 5 – 10 October 1962 on Poland's territory, on the Baltic Sea, and, partially, on East Germany's territory, in Copenhagen – Magdeburg – Poznań – Słupsk area.
The theme of the military exercise – Organising and waging a combined operation of descent and anti-descent , in which marines and paratroops units – and its general concept were obviously in accordance with the “Sokolovskii doctrine”. Thus, “the Western Forces, secretly concentrating their troops under the pretext of military exercises, carry out the first strike against the Eastern Forces and proceed with the offensive, giving the main strike on WITTENBERG - North BERLIN direction. […] The Eastern Forces (the Sea-shore Front and the Berlin Front), carrying out the nuclear strike against the Western Forces, regroup their troops, simultaneously neutralising the effects of the nuclear strike by the Western Forces, in order to stop the latter's offensive and start their own offensive on the main direction BRESLAU – HAMBURG” [4] .
Altogether, approximately 32,000 troops, 250 tanks, 300 armoured carriers, 250 aircraft, 5,000 vehicles and 105 vessels participated in the “BALTIC-ODER” military exercise; 5,000 military personnel and 1,000 vehicles were involved in conducting the exercise. [5]
Analysing the report drawn up by the Romanian Colonel-General Arhip Floca [6] on the exercise which he witnessed, we can notice that the overall maneuver concept makes no reference to organising and waging defence actions. The Western Forces (fictitiously considered as belonging to NATO) carried out a surprise attack using nuclear means, and the Eastern Forces (belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization) regrouped and proceeded with the offensive. In all likelihood, the military personnel who drew up the general concept of the exercise deliberately avoided the words “defence” and “defensive” in order to comply with the “Sokolovskii doctrine”.
According to the general concept of the exercise, the enemy military forces carried out the offensive by surprise, massively using the nuclear weapon. Their main strike was given on the WITTENBERG - North BERLIN direction. In order to ensure the left flank of NATO's main group, “Baltic Army Group” – made up of two mechanised infantry divisions, a motorised infantry division and an airborne division (the 16 th Airborne Division) – disembarked on the enemy seashore in Mielno-Unieście – Dziwnów sector and articulated its combat group with two echelons, having the 11 th and 13 th Mechanised Infantry Divisions in the first echelon, and the 6 th Motorised Infantry Division in the second echelon. The “Baltic Army Group” sector was 70 km wide. [7]
In order to attract and fix the reserves of the Eastern Forces (belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization), it was assumed that the 16 th Airborne Division had been parachuted in Ińsko district (in Poland). Thus, the freedom of action of NATO's main group was ensured.
At the same time, the ones in charge of conceiving the exercise also provided for the launch of the 1 st Airborne Division in Cedynia district (in Poland). The main objectives of this unit were to conquer the passes over the Oder River and to prevent the WTO forces from passing towards the front line.
According to the overall concept of the exercise, the Polish – Soviet – East German troops within the Eastern Forces (the WTO) were to take the following actions: the Berlin Front – against NATO's main army group; the Seashore Front – against “Baltic Army Group”; the WTO Reserves – against the 16 th and 1 st Airborne Divisions, in Ińsko and Cedynia districts.
In the beginning of the exercise, the Polish General who was leading “Baltic Army Group” suggested the fictitious setting on fire of an area of approximately 13000 m 2 . For this purpose, he requested the assistance of the superior echelon in order to be provided with the necessary means for launching 432 napalm bombs. Furthermore, the commander of that group advanced the idea of fictitiously establishing a radioactively contaminated area, 200 km long and 30 km wide, with a view to backing up the combat actions of his maritime descent. The two suggestions were not approved, being considered that “taking such measures would have rendered the combat actions of our own troops more difficult” [8] .
As his initial decisions had not been accepted, the commander of “Baltic Army Group” used 6 Soviet Mil ‘Hook' Mi-6 and 33 Mil ‘Hound' Mi-4 helicopters (nicknames in the NATO's code) in order to back up the combat actions of the maritime descent, also carrying out the tactical launch of a battalion in the depth of the enemy territory. It took an extremely short time to disembark the troops from the helicopters and to proceed with the combat missions.
“Baltic Army Group” performed a maritime descent in the real mode, of the value of a marines' regiment. After a fictitious preparation fire training – in which nuclear weapons were also used – 1,200 troops, 10 T-54 tanks and 8 amphibious tanks disembarked in four waves on the seashore. The first two waves were made up of reconnaissance platoons and engineer squads, amphibious tanks and T-54 tanks. The third wave comprised the infantry companies, and the last one, the regiment staff. Simultaneously, three torpedo boats carried out a joint operation in order to occupy a harbour.
In order to mark the entry into combat of the 16 th Paratroopers Division, in Ińsko district were parachuted in three waves a division staff, the strengths of a paratroopers battalion, two battalion steering structures and logistic subunits. [9]
With a view to countering the airborne actions, the commander of the Eastern Forces (WTO) fictitiously engaged a tank division, which immediately proceeded with obliterating the foeman. That action was really marked by the maneuvers of a tank regiment in the Polish fire range at Drawsko Pomorskie. On that occasion, a part of the artillery engaged in the “Baltic-Oder” exercise executed direct-aiming shootings and shootings from covert fire positions. At the same time, a tank company opened fire against targets set at the maximum range limit of the board weapons, and the air force carried out a series of bombardments with live ammunition.
During the next stage of the exercise, a Soviet mechanised regiment (which also comprised a tank battalion) forced the Oder River from the West to the East, in a single wave. That action was carried out in close co-operation with the 1 st Airborne Division, which had been fictitiously launched in Cedynia district in order to occupy the passage points over the Oder River. It took 25 minutes to force the crossing and the operation was carried with modern descent means: amphibious tanks, BTR-50 P armoured personnel carriers, and tanks that had been prepared to cross underwater. Regarding this moment of the exercise, Colonel-General Arhip Floca wrote in his report that “the tank battalion of the regiment forced the river underwater on three routes (each company on a route)” [10] ; 27 Soviet Mil ‘ Hound' Mi-4 and 6 Mil ‘ Hook' Mi-6 helicopters backed up the Soviet mechanised regiment while forcing the Oder River, launching a battalion-level tactical descent in the depth of the enemy's defence.
The First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka, together with Prime-Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz attended the parachuting in Ińsko district and the forcing of the Oder River. [11]
The military maneuvers were completed on 7 October 1962, after the East German army had presented “the deployment and moving attack of a motorised infantry division” [12] . However, the real combat exercises had been executed by a single regiment.
The post-mission critique of the double-action “BALTIC-ODER” military exercise with troops was performed on 10 October 1962, in Poland. The reunion was attended by the following participants: Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko (b. 1903 – d. 1976), Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces; Colonel-General Marian Spychalski, the Polish Minister of People's Defence, together with the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army; the Soviet Army Generals Piotr I. Batov and Ivan I. Iakubovskii (b. 1912 – d. 1976); the Soviet Vice-Admiral Oriol; generals and officers from the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization who trade been invited to attend the military maneuvers. The Polish, Soviet and East German commanders of the units and subunits that had been directly involved in the exercise also attended the meeting.
In the beginning of the reunion, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army delivered a 30 minute presentation about the concept and the course of action of the exercise. Then, Colonel-General Marian Spychalski delivered a two-hour presentation on the most important results of his analysis and assessed the participants' performance.
The most important problem underlined by the Polish Minister of People's Defence was the leadership of the troops. The participation by units from three distinct national armies, the lack of homogeneity within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the long distances separating the allied troops affected the command system during the “BALTIC-ODER” military exercise. Additional problems were caused by the difficulty of the exercise scenario, which provided far a surprise initial strike by the enemy who also used the nuclear weapon on a massive scale. Regrouping the Eastern Forces (WTO) and putting them at the same time to neutralise the consequences of the nuclear strikes also proved problematic. Consequently, the commanders of all echelons were hindered to a large extent from carrying out their missions.
The conclusions reached by Colonel-General M. Spychalski were in accordance with Marshal A. A. Grechko's desires: creating a unified leadership system within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and extending the knowledge of foreign languages (especially Russian). [13] Both the Polish Defence Minister and the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces noticed how ineffectual the co-operation between the WTO member states was due to the incompatibility existing among the national military structures of states within the alliance: the lower military structure, from the level of national commands to the level of units or subunits, the more obvious the discrepancies regarding the collaboration between the allies.
In such circumstances, if no proactive measures were taken, the military incompatibility of the WTO member states could become a heavy burden for the Soviet Union. [14] In May 1955, Moscow established a political-military organization for the obvious purpose of maintaining its dominance in Central and Eastern Europe, and not for being destroyed by its own creation. This might be one of the reasons why Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, an advocate of the “Sokolovskii doctrine”, did not accept that the Warsaw Treaty Organization should have weak points. Colonel-General Arhip Floca referred to the stance expressed by the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces during the post-mission critique of the “BALTIC-ODER” exercise, as follows: “The armed forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty Organization must continuously strengthen their combat capacity in order to be able to provide any aggressor with the appropriate response, not on their territory but on the territory of the aggressor”. The Soviet Marshal also emphasised “the necessity to thoroughly analyse the theatre of operations in North-Western Europe; this theatre is extremely important as carrying out a firm offensive on this direction and destroying the NATO troops in the left flank would enable the destruction of NATO bloc's main group in Central Europe” [15] .
Making reference to these actions of the 16 th Airborne Division launched in Ińsko district, the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces criticised the fact that the paratroopers organised the defence against a tank division of the Eastern Forces, having practically no chance to resist the advance of the enemy. In his opinion, the paratroopers should have been assigned “active combat missions”, such as destroying the nuclear missiles and conquering important objectives (check and passage points, command posts, headquarters etc.). [16]
Marshal Andrei Grechko also criticised the pilots for their poor performance during the joint exercise, especially in Drawsko Pomorskie fire range . The pilots executed the bombardments flying horizontally and not while elevating or diving aircraft, to the discontent of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces. Colonel-General Arhip Floca agreed with the Soviet Marshal's conclusion and mentioned the following in his report: “The actions of the [Romanian] air force will be led by air groups and the bombardments will be executed while elevating or diving the aircraft” [17] .
Only a few days after the completion of the “BALTIC-ODER” joint exercise, three armed forces of the WTO member states participated in another military exercise, in Romania (in Dobrogea district). [18] The double-action maneuver had the following themes: “Waging combat actions by joint forces, in co-operation with the Navy and air forces, for the purpose of deterring the enemy's descent and obliterating the enemy on the Dobrogea seashore”, and “The maritime and air descent in the initial stage of the war”. [19] By the themes and scenario of the military exercise, the Unified Command of the WTO again imposed compliance with the Soviet Union's global military strategy, drawn up by Marshal Vasilii D. Sokolovskii.
The plan drawn up by the Unified Command in October 1961 stipulated that the Romanian Ministry of Armed Forces should provide the organisation and leadership of the joint exercise in collaboration with two groups made up of 8-10 Soviet and, respectively, Bulgarian officers and generals.
Colonel-General Ion Tutoveanu, Chief of the Romanian General Staff, specified in the plan he sent to Moscow in October 1961 that “the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Odessa Military District were each to participate in the exercise with an Army command and a division, with reinforcement means” [20] (from Romania: the Command of the 2 nd Army and the 2 nd Mechanised Infantry Division).
After almost a year, on 25 September 1962, Army General Leontin Sălăjan submitted a top secret report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party. [21] The report contained details about the military forces participating in “the first ample military exercise organised and carried out in our country, in which troops from the fraternal armed forces take part” [22] . At the same time, as commander of the exercise, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces specified that 27,500 Romanian personnel, 7,500 Soviet troops and 2,000 Bulgarian military personnel were to participate in the exercise.
The arsenal engaged in the WTO exercise in Dobrogea district comprised 310 tanks and armoured self-propelled cannons, 3,650 armoured personnel carriers, trucks and special vehicles, 60 air carriers and 120 aircraft (fighters and ground-attack fighters). In addition, 76 vessels from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies also participated in the maneuvers. [23]
During the maneuvers, the 2 nd and 72 nd Romanian Bridges' Regiments, as well as the Soviet bridges' regiment were assigned the mission to build three bridges over the Danube River. [24]
As the exercise was provided for in the combat training plan drawn up by the Unified Command of the WTO, Army General Leontin Sălăjan extended invitations to his counterparts within the alliance, except the Albanian Defence Minister, to attend the maneuvers. The Minister of the Romanian Armed Forces also invited “a few comrades from the leadership of the Romanian Workers' Party and the Government” [25] to attend the exercise and the military parade that was to take place in Constanţa city after the maneuvers were completed. [26]
Both the military exercise in Romania in October 1962 and the “BALTIC-ODER” exercise were based upon the plans which the Soviets had drawn up and co-ordinated in advance through the Unified Command of the WTO, and the commanders who led those military maneuvers complied with the doctrine drawn up by Marshal Vasilii D. Sokolovskii.
According to the Soviet theorist, it was essential for the success in war that the offensive should be unleashed very rapidly. The political leader Nikita Khrushchev understood this concept very well and in 1962 he tried to create a strategic advantage over the Americans by deploying medium-range missiles in Cuba. Thus, Cuba became a hot spot for the Soviet and American leaders, Nikita Khrushchev and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and the crisis automatically extended to the European states.
Reviewing the facts, we can notice that the WTO military exercises in October 1962 happened to take place only a few days before the crisis of Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.
We can also notice that the authorities in Moscow did not schedule the military exercise in Poland, GDR and Romania so that they overlap. The Soviet leaders might have avoided this overlapping in order not to be suspected by the NATO military commander of preparing a surprise military strike in Europe. If the Soviets wanted to unleash a world war in October 1962 in Europe, among other things they should have maintained the Soviet, the Polish, the East German, the Romanian and Bulgarian forces that participated in the WTO maneuvers in the concentration area.
At this stage of our research, we can state the fact that the “BALTIC-ODER” military exercise, as well as the exercise in Romania in mid-October 1962 had no direct connection with the crisis of the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba. NATO's military leaders are very likely to have monitored those military maneuvers and analysed them more carefully during the last ten days of October, when the crisis of the missiles in Cuba reached its climax.
Being aware of the fact that an open dispute with the leader in Moscow would not be to his advantage, the Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej did not officially protest against the Soviets' stance during the missiles crisis in Cuba. [27] However, two years later, in April 1964, the Romanian political leader used “The Statement by the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party” as a lightning rod against the potential Soviet encroachments in Romania. In fact, that document was a corollary of the new stance adopted by the regime in Bucharest in its relations with the Soviet Union. Without denying the precepts of totalitarianism, the Romanian communists stated their own national ideas, although the political, military and economic framework in this region of Europe was obviously dominated by the Kremlin's decisions.
Major PETRE OPRIŞ was born in 1968 in Craiova, Romania. He was educated in military studies in Craiova and Sibiu (1983 – 1990), and in history studies in Bucharest (1992 – 1997). He was artillery commissioned officer (1990 – 1999) and editor officer (1999 – 2002, Review of Military History and Strategic Monitor. Review for Security and Defence Studies – publications of the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, Bucharest). Since 2002 he is member of t he Service of Protection and Guard, Bucharest, and Ph.D. candidate in Iassy, Romania. The title of his Ph.D. dissertation is Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955 – 1991) . E-mail: petreopris (at) yahoo.com.
Notes:
[1] Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii (ed.), Strategia militară [The Military Strategy] , (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1972), 353-54.
[2] In certain Romanian documents, the name of the Polish General also appears as “Spîhalski”.
[3] In Polish documents, the code name of military maneuver appears as „BALTYK-ODRA”, and in Romanian documents as „BALTICA-ODER”.
[4] The Romanian Military Archives (abbreviated in Romanian as AMR, for Arhivele Militare Române), Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 194-95. (This source will hereafter be referred to as RMA.)
[5] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 193-94. The armed forces engaged by Poland, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in the “BALTIC-ODER” exercise were the following:
1. The Polish military forces: an Army command; a section as “Baltic Army Group” (belonging to the Western Forces, NATO); a tank division command; a manned tank regiment; a mechanised division command; a manned mechanised regiment; an airborne division command; a manned paratroopers battalion; a bridges' regiment; an air division (fighters); two naval air wings; descent vessel units; logistic units.
2. The Soviet military forces: a tank division command; a manned mechanised regiment; a motorised infantry battalion (marines); three air divisions; a helicopter regiment; bridges' units; descent vessels; logistic units.
3. The East German military forces: a mechanised division command; a manned regiment; descent vessels; an infantry company (marines); logistic units.
[6] At that moment, Colonel-General Arhip Floca was Deputy Minister of the Romanian Armed Forces and Chief of the Combat Training Directorate (in MoD).
[7] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 194-95.
[8] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 195.
[9] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 196.
[10] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 197.
[11] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 194.
[12] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 197.
[13] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 200.
[14] The stances expressed by the Marshal Andrei A. Grechko and Colonel-General Marian Spychalski on the occasion of the “BALTIC-ODER” exercise critique obviously pertain to the line of proactive measures as they wanted to strengthen the political-military alliance to which the states they represented belonged.
[15] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 201.
[16] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 202.
[17] RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b, 201-02.
[18] Bordered in Western and Northern by the Danube River, and in Eastearn by the Black Sea, Dobrogea district imposed amphibious descent operations on the Black Sea shore and the banks of the most important river in this region of Europe. Furthermore, in order to successfully complete the military operations, it is necessary to engage paratroopers units for occupying and maintaining the check and passage points over the Danube River.
According to the Plan of the Unified Command regarding the operational and combat training in 1962 (for the Romanian Armed Forces) , the command of the 2 nd Army and the 2 nd Mechanised Division were to participate in a double-action military exercise with troops, which involved forcing the Danube River between 1 – 10 October 1962.
That plan (having the registration number I0/15903/23 October 1961) was drawn up in Russian and signed by the Soviet Colonel-General Gusev. The Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, Army General A. I. Antonov, attached that plan to a letter (registration no. I 172127) and sent them to Colonel-General Ion Tutoveanu, the Romanian Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff.
In the reply of document (registration no. 1693/28 October 1961), the Romanian Chief of the General Staff wrote that he agreed with the plan forwarded by Unified Command of the WTO and suggested that two new tactical lessons should be included in the same plan: The offensive of joint forces, including breaking the enemy's defence on the move and forcing a wide river and The defence of joint forces in modern conditions . Furthermore, Colonel-General Ion Tutoveanu requested that the wire and radio transmission materials and descent means (provided for in the import plan of the Romanian Army for 1962 year) should be delivered during the first half of 1962, together with 5 floating tanks and 10 K-61 amphibious vehicles, destined to carry troops. Thus, the Romanian military that were to participate in the exercise in October 1962 had enough time to learn how to handle the imported military equipment.
The document written by the Chief of the General Staff was submitted to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej before it was sent to Moscow. The Romanian political leader gave the decision “I agree” and signed it.
In September 1962, Army General Leontin Sălăjan, Minister of the Armed Forces, informed the leaders of the Romanian Workers' Party that the starting date of the exercise had been changed. The exercise was to start on 15 October 1962 and to last for two days and a half. One more day was destined for drafting and presenting the post-exercise critique. Central Historical National Archives (abbreviated in Romanian as ANIC, for Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale), Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party – Chancellery Collection, file 56/1960, 19; file 46/1961, 11-21; file 28/1962, 111. (This source will hereafter be referred to as CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery.)
[19] CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 28/1962, 110.
[20] CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 46/1961, 12.
[21] That document was entitled Report on the maneuver including troops that will be carry on in October 1962 and was registered with no. F.S. 002893/25 September 1962 at the Cabinet of the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces.
[22] CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 28/1962, 110.
[23] CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 28/1962, 110-12. The armed forces engaged by Romania, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria in the exercise in October 1962 were the following:
1. The Romanian military forces: the command of the 2 nd Army with all the commands of army units and subunits; the fully manned 1 st Mechanised “Tudor Vladimirescu” Division; the 9 th Mechanised “Mărăşeşti” Division with all the commands of the mechanised, tank and artillery regiments (each of those regiments participated with a reinforced motorised infantry battalion, and a tank battalion and artillery division respectively); the 2 nd and the 72 nd Bridges' Regiments; the 52 nd , 53 rd and 54 th Engineer Regiments; the 47 th and 48 th Signal Regiments; the 16 th Air Defence Division with all subordinate units; the 36 th Airborne Battalion; the entire Romanian Navy.
2. The Soviet military forces: the command of the 118 th Motorised Infantry Division with a fully manned motorised infantry regiment (the other regiments of the division participated only with their staffs and company/battalion subunits, each staff having a tank platoon and an artillery battery in its subordination); a bridges' regiment; an airborne regiment; two wings of ground-attack fighters; 60 Soviet Antonov 'Camp' An-8 and Antonov 'Cat' An-10 air carriers; units and subunits of the Black Sea Red Fleet.
3. The Bulgarian military forces: the command of the 16 th Motorised Infantry Division with a regiment staff and a reinforced motorised infantry battalion; 24 fighters and ground-attack fighters; most vessels of the Bulgarian Navy.
[24] CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 28/1962, 112.
[25] The following persons attended the exercise and the military parade: Gheorghe Apostol. Prime Vice-President of the Minister's Council; Nicolae Ceauşescu, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party; Alexandru Drăghici, Minister of the Interior Affairs; Gaston Marin, President of the State Planning Committee; Simulescu Dumitru, Minister of Transport and Communications; Vîlcu Vasile, Prime-Secretary of Dobrogea Regional Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party. CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 28/1962, 1-4.
[26] For the first time after the establishment of the WTO (May 1955), the Romanian authorities issued an official statement the national press (on the Bucharest radio station – 18 October 1962, 11.00 p.m.) about the completion of the first WTO maneuver organised and carry out in Romania, in which troops from the USSR and People's Republic of Bulgaria. Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact. Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution , (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973), 71.
[27] The Romanian political and military leaders were taken by surprise by the crisis of the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba. The first information was learned on the news bulletins of the foreign radio stations.
