

**Record of the Statements of the Delegation Chiefs at the
Unofficial Meeting of First Secretaries and Premiers of the
Governments of Member-States of the Warsaw Treaty¹**

[...]

Brezhnev: [...] This morning we had an exchange of opinions regarding the possible inclusion in the text of the Declaration of a formulation proposed by Cde. Novotný regarding the accountability of the United States for damages due to the aggressive activities of the U.S. The Soviet delegation supports this proposal. Such a formulation would include two ideas. First, that all of us together with the Vietnamese nation run a ledger regarding losses inflicted on Vietnamese cities, villages, and industrial facilities, etc. from American bombings. And that the world society together with the Vietnamese nation will present such a bill to the American government, to the American aggressors.

Second thought—that world public opinion will come out with a political accusation against the American aggressors as war instigators, similar to the case of the Second World War against the Hitlerites.

Novotný: Stating his proposition precisely, said: We present the bill for material and human losses.

Brezhnev: One does not present a bill for humans, there is no price for a human life. We can talk about accountability for war and material losses inflicted on Vietnam.

Ceașescu: We can connect the first idea with the second, saying that the Americans should take responsibility as war instigators for crimes committed against the civilian population as was the case after the Second World War.

Brezhnev: One can exclude the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]—it is not conducting a war, it is defending itself. And that is why one should formulate this sharply.

[...]

Gomułka: It would be best if our document had a more concrete character. It should be in the form of a note rather than a resolution. Besides, I think that we should avoid a formulation such as "we are presenting a bill."

[...]

Ceașescu: The declaration we adopt should be a very strong document, it cannot have the character of a diplomatic note. It should reflect the determined will of the socialist countries that sharply condemn American imperialism; it should demand an immediate condemnation of the aggression. If they continue their aggressive activities we will also be obliged to take other steps.

As far as the matter of solidarity with Vietnam, it must be an appeal to all governments of the world and to democratic movements, so they develop a broad movement in defense of Vietnam. This meets the Vietnamese comrades' plea and the appeal of the National Liberation Front published today, which called on socialist countries to support Vietnam. If we did not publish such a declaration, the world would

¹ From Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), pp. 220-236.

not understand why the party first secretaries and government premiers assembled. This has meaning not only for Vietnam. This will be an expression of our decisiveness also toward the German problem and generally to world problems. After all, it is the first time in a long time that the representatives of seven socialist countries have assembled in order to adopt a statement regarding a serious matter. And here one does not need a diplomatic note; a note can be sent and we do not need to assemble for that purpose. This is not what the international communist movement awaits, but a statement that will be a help to it.

[...]

Gomulka: [...] We are in favor of a most determined, sharp, powerful, and concrete document. And that is why we think that it should not be in the form of a resolution such as one adopts during rallies or in the form of a newspaper article. [...] Here I have the latest Chinese statement in front of me. To make no mention of its content, I think it serves as an example of how one should write such a statement [...] I am not assuming a position toward it, but the form is good and we should give our Declaration a Chinese form, but put our content [in it].

[...]

Ulbricht: [...] The statement we adopt here will have particular meaning for both German nations. It should help us to strengthen the protest movement in the FRG against support for American imperialism. We agree with the proposal of Cde. Brezhnev and Cde. Novotný: let the editorial board work on the statement draft; it will be easier for us to

Ceaușescu: I am sorry that I am speaking for the second time, but because Cde. Gomulka expressed himself regarding the Romanian proposal in the form that he did, I want to say that I do not share his opinion. We did not want to evaluate a Polish proposal, we also have our opinion about it, but we did not gather here to mutually evaluate our drafts. (Gomulka: I do not claim that our proposal should be deemed the best one since we had only two hours to work on this project). But, if we were, at least, to take the last three points of the Polish draft, then this is contrary to our [...]; one could understand this as capitulation to American imperialism. [...]

Gomulka: [...] I would also not be forced to speak again if Cde. Ceaușescu would not force me to it due to his statement in which he evaluated the stance of our CC, our party and government, included in the Polish draft, as capitulationist. We categorically reject this. With what right, on what basis, does Cde. Ceaușescu insinuate such an assessment that we are calling for capitulation to American imperialism?! Toward American aggression? Our party, government, and people have never capitulated to American or any other imperialism.

[...]

Did we insult you, because you [should] tell us that what I said is not acceptable to you? Speaking of your draft of the Statement, we did not assess the position of your CC, or your government; we only talked about the tone of the document. I called it a “rally resolution” and I expressed our opinion that the document should be more concrete, [there should be] a more serious format and that is why I talked about the [form of the] note. What is insulting about that? And you insulted me. To say that a party like ours, the government and the Polish people, capitulates to American aggression—this is insulting to us! Surely, Cde. Ceaușescu, as the host of the meeting, has not learned how to conduct

talks in such circles as he has managed to assess our party, our nation, in this way. And I hereby declare an official protest against such formulations of Cde. Ceaușescu—that we are capitulating to American aggression!

[...]

Ceaușescu: I would like to say to Cde. Gomułka that it surprises me that from the discussion of a concrete document it has come around to discussion of the position of the PUWP. This is not the subject of our negotiations and when Cde. Gomułka was talking about our draft; I understood that he was not talking about the position of our party. If that were the case, I would approach things differently.

But if one side condemns a document, then in turn, it should listen to the opinion of the other side about its draft. Cde. Gomułka also characterized our draft in a form that is unacceptable to us.

Gomułka: We characterized your draft as a rally resolution and you as us capitulating before the Americans. We did not insult you, but you insulted us.

Brezhnev: I think that we should respect our resolutions. Yesterday at the evening session [...] we came to an understanding that the ministers of foreign affairs will take all three drafts and will try to give the joint Declaration a more governmental character since seven countries are assembled [here]. [...] And this is the first thing which I wanted to say.

Second, [...] I would not like to start polemics with Cde. Ceaușescu, but when he mentioned capitulation it sounded like he was talking about the Polish party, and Cde. Gomułka could have felt insulted. After all, we all know that the Polish party has never capitulated.

It appears from the statements of all comrades that such a document is needed, but do we need to ponder over whether this is to be a note or a statement right now? Would it perhaps be better if it were a Joint Statement addressed to governments?

Gomułka: I did speak for it to being in the form of a note.

[...]

Brezhnev: Cde. Ceaușescu brought up the matter possibly withdrawing from the 18-member Committee [...] His point is not a formal and documented withdrawal from the Committee, but a practical step.

Ceaușescu: [...] I consider it necessary that socialist countries participating in the work of the Disarmament Committee [in Geneva] no longer take part in this work until the American aggression in Vietnam is over. It is after all difficult to conduct discussions on disarmament when the war in Vietnam is being escalated at the same time. This would have great political significance and it would show assertiveness and determination on the part of the socialist countries as well as positively influence other anti-American movements.

[...]

Novotný: This is a very important issue, which is not connected to the current conflict in Vietnam. One has to think. [...] Are we withdrawing from the Committee or are we stating that we will not be participating for now?

Ceaușescu: We would like to propose this formulation—that we will not participate.

Novotný: The point is not to play into their hands. Here the problem relates to

Europe and borders, and since this is a new issue, allow us to think about this, give us time to think and consult with the appropriate organs in our country. We may possibly come to an understanding to meet at an appropriate time and discuss this topic.

Gomulka: We are not prepared to discuss this issue. My personal opinion is that one cannot exclude the fact that such a situation may arise, but one has to wait for the results of our Declaration regarding the issue of European security because there is a certain contradiction here: on the one hand we are proposing steps towards disarmament, and at the same time we are leaving the Committee.

Brezhnev: One has to be reminded of the fact that in this Committee socialist and neutral countries comprise two-thirds, and the capitalist countries, on which we are exerting pressure, only one-third. If we leave the Committee, the neutral countries will be left without any help. (Kosygin: And after all, the Committee itself was created at our request.) And all of this has to be taken into account. And the most important is the situation at the present time, which as I said, we do not know in detail.

Ceașescu: In principle, our government thinks it right not to participate in the work of the Committee any longer.

At this, the meeting of delegation heads ended, deciding that the ministers will gather once more on the same day and the results of their work will be presented at the meeting of first secretaries and government premiers.

The course of the evening meeting of the ministers was very short. [...]

The next day, July 6, 1966, at 7:30, the ministers assembled again having already before them a draft prepared by the Polish delegation which took into account the Polish remarks, both substantive and structural. Despite the fact that all delegations, except for the Romanian one, stated that the draft had been improved due to the Polish corrections, Minister Mănescu nevertheless stated that this was an entirely new draft, this time a Polish one, and he demanded that one be worked out based on the previous draft.

In this situation, [Foreign] Minister [Adam] Rapacki stated that he did not see any possibility of continuing this meeting of the ministers. Further discussion did not change the view of the Romanians and the ministers found themselves at an impasse, about which each delegation informed its leadership.

2. Meeting of the delegation chiefs regarding CMEA—July 6, 1966, 10:00.

[. . .]

3. Meeting of delegation chiefs regarding the Statement on Vietnam: July 6, 1966, 11:30.

Texts of the statement were distributed at the beginning.

a) A text worked out on July 5 as a combination of the Russian and Romanian draft.

b) A text based on the above-mentioned draft, but including Polish corrections.

Ulbricht: [...] We gathered here in order to reach understanding on the issue of the statement on Vietnam. The meeting of the ministers, which found itself at an impasse, was chaired by Minister Janos Péter. I will ask him to inform us about the state of the work on the joint draft.

Péter: [...] In connection with the quarrel over procedures our work was interrupted. The quarrel over procedures boiled down to the following points: before

yesterday the Working Committee, appointed by the ministers, had prepared a draft document for the ministers. The ministers submitted a series of remarks, which were included in the document in writing. The remarks were submitted in part by the Romanian comrades and in part by the Polish comrades. In addition, some ministers of foreign affairs warned that they had a series of comments on this draft.

This morning, the Polish comrades prepared a new draft taking into account all proposals. And one must say that indeed all the proposals were included in this draft: both the remarks submitted in writing yesterday by the Romanians and Poles as well as the wishes of the Vietnamese comrades. Also, what was discussed yesterday at the plenary session was also included. The six ministers of foreign affairs acknowledged that a new document should serve as the basis. [...] Cde. Mănescu, the minister of foreign affairs of Romania, insisted that yesterday's draft be adopted as a basis.

[...] Therefore, our work found itself at a dead end.

[...]

Novotný: Cde. Péter stated that this is a new draft. I read the previous draft and I think that the formulation "new" does not correspond with reality. This is a further development of the old draft, to which remarks were included and in which there were certain editorial improvements. This is how we understand this draft.

Péter: (confirms.)

Ceașescu: [...] This draft is unacceptable to us since it represents a step backward in relation to the previous draft, and we propose that the draft worked out yesterday by the committee comprised of the ministers of foreign affairs be adopted as the basis. [...]

Gomułka once more explained that what is called "the Polish draft" is not a new draft. [...] When it comes to the issue of substance, then it includes all proposals: Soviet, Romanian, Polish and all others that were submitted by the ministers. It also includes entirely new points, which were suggested by the Vietnamese side. A significant majority of the ministers stated that the Polish corrections improved the text and supported it. Cde. Gomułka appealed to the Romanians not to be petty, to rise to the situation as it exists, and guided by our main goal, that is, providing support to the Vietnamese nation, accept the proposed draft without discussion as a joint draft by our delegations, the Warsaw Pact nations.

Kádár: I propose ending the formal discussion [...] and before we break up to give appropriate directives to our ministers to finish work on the draft.

Brezhnev: With regard to the fact that Cde. Ceașescu broached the issue of procedures at the first plenary session and, as far as I understood, due to this the document cannot be adopted, I am forced to return to the history of this problem.

At the request of all of you, the Foreign Ministry of the USSR received an assignment to work on a draft of a document which was to become the basis for discussion. We completed the assignment and while coming to the meeting we did not think that a Soviet draft, or a draft by any other party, would be discussed. Having discussed this at the Politburo, we counted on the fact that comrades would pay appropriate attention to this elaborated document, and that they would unquestionably add their remarks, which would improve it.

However, the circumstances turned out to be different: the Romanian comrades on

their own initiative wrote their own draft. We had nothing against this, especially since there were no fundamental differences between these drafts. The Polish comrades also had the right to make their remarks. After all, everyone has such a right.

That is why we assigned the ministers of foreign affairs [...] to work out a joint text. We did not have any intention to say entirely whose draft would be adopted [...] We are working on examining the collective effort of the ministers of foreign affairs. And in no document will the author of this draft be written. [...] Therefore the arguments of Cde. Ceaușescu are not convincing. Why such minutiae? [...] We think that the draft is very good, it entirely reflects the essence of the problem, and the ministers were able to include in it everything submitted by the delegations. [...]

Maurer: [...] On behalf of the Romanian delegation Cde. Ceaușescu stated that this draft is unacceptable to us. And he said that this was not due to procedural or formal reasons. We want to assure Cde. Gomułka that we have many comments pertaining to this document, which relate not only to the organization of the material, and even this in a certain sense shows shades of difference—very important ones—which I think Cde. Gomułka did not notice given all of his great experience.

We oppose some of the ideas included in this document [...] We understand that every socialist country is providing material support to Vietnam in its fight against American aggression. We know that in this field the most significant and effective is the assistance from the Soviet Union. And we do not doubt that if the Vietnamese comrades were to turn for help to any of us we would not refuse them any help.

But here there is talk about the political support Vietnam needs. Instead, in our opinion, in the draft of the statement that was provided in the morning, some opinions have been presented in a different way from which the Vietnamese comrades would like to see them. And this is not only their wish, but ours also [...]

Ceaușescu: [...] We have many comments with regards to the morning draft. Adopting this draft as a basis means that we should start our work from the beginning. [...]

The point is to solve the issue pragmatically. We do not have anything against the fact that the Polish comrades submitted their remarks. But since Cde. Gomułka said that the new draft included all previous propositions, then to facilitate the work we propose to use yesterday's draft as the basis and let the Polish comrades say what corrections should be introduced. This will facilitate our work and we will not have to start the work over from the beginning.

[...]

Ulbricht: When Cde. Ceaușescu says that one should simply take the old draft and add to it the two Romanian corrections, it is not "simple" because after all over 20 Romanian corrections were already taken into account and included in this draft by the ministers of foreign affairs. The old draft also takes into account our corrections and I think that the same applies to other delegations. [...] I would propose to appoint a small group comprised of Brezhnev, Gomułka and Ceaușescu, who could find a way in the shortest amount of time.

Ceaușescu: I have a question for Cde. Gomułka. As I understood it, that evening remarks were received regarding your draft from all the ministers of foreign affairs. Were remarks also received from the Romanian minister of foreign affairs?

[...]

Gomulka: Asking [deputy foreign] Minister [Marian] Naszkowski to give an explanation.

Naszkowski: Explained that nobody was consulted and that is also why Mănescu was not being consulted. The text worked out by the Polish delegation was sent out before the morning meeting to all ministers along with a cover letter in which there was a mention of the Polish corrections.

Ulbricht: Clear and let us end the discussion.

Brezhnev: We cannot end since we have not come up with anything and the point pertains to fundamental issues. Perhaps Cde. Ceaușescu would tell us what his fundamental objections are.

Ceaușescu: [...] We do have remarks concerning the draft and one has to delegate to the ministers to discuss everything page by page. We would like to move some ideas from the old text to the new. We agree that there are a series of good and new things in the new draft, but we have reservations about some formulations. We agree that the ministers started their work, but let the ministers do this, not us, because otherwise we will transform ourselves into an Editorial Board. We will give them until afternoon and let them present what they have come up with.

[...]

Gomulka: Let Minister Mănescu give concrete remarks on the morning draft because we have already been sitting over this for two days and now the matter has risen to a higher level.

Brezhnev: (became aggravated). We cannot sit here indefinitely. Our country is suffering due to natural disasters which have come upon us recently. Earthquakes, floods, etc. In Tashkent about 2,000 buildings have been destroyed, Krasnoyarsk is under water, Kuban—demolished homes in Kabar—an earthquake, and we are sitting here and thinking: a committee or a sub-committee! [...]

Here lies a letter before me from the Vietnamese comrades—absolutely everything is in this document. I have read the document twice and the letter from the Vietnamese. Comrades, we need to treat one another with respect. In the end even six countries can sign.

Ceaușescu: If the six of you want to sign, nobody is stopping you from doing so, but in the form in which this document exists, we cannot sign it.

This kind of pressure cannot be tolerated among communist and workers' parties. Please write this down. We will send out our position to all of the parties. We think that the principles of equality and mutual respect should exist among communist and workers' parties. We reject similar attempts at pressure. Maintaining unity, which is so desired, is only possible when we abide by the principles of equality and mutual respect. People are suffering in Vietnam and we are not providing Vietnam with full political and diplomatic aid, which we can afford! We are not discussing the issue of whether we should remain in the Geneva Committee or not while the Americans are bombing Vietnam. What disarmament negotiations can be conducted with the Americans in such a situation? We also want the statement to have mobilizing power, that it address the nations and communist parties, and that it help Vietnam. That is why we wanted and agreed to have such a Joint Statement. Why are you portraying the issue in such a way that if Romania

does not agree than we would sign it without her? Please, go ahead and sign. Then we will publish our Declaration.

Ulbricht: We have a proposal from Cde. Brezhnev that the Romanian comrades submit their remarks in writing as to the draft.

Novotný: I propose to make one last effort. Let us give time to the ministers beginning at 14:00, and at 17:00 we will assemble once more, we will discuss the issue and we will make a decision on what to do in such a situation.

[...]

Brezhnev: I categorically and decidedly reject the statement that there was any talk of pressure in my speech. I made statements several times and while sitting next to Cde. Ceaușescu I told him several times about our concern about the situation in the nation and our impatience due to being outside the country at such a moment. And Cde. Ceaușescu is throwing such accusations at me. And in addition he threatens us with writing to all the fraternal parties. This is a threat. And what is it that you are going to write? Let us end this, I accept Cde. Novotný's proposal.

[...]

At the ministers' meeting, which lasted not until 16:00 [...], but which dragged on until 19:00, Mănescu announced over 20 comments to the draft. As a result of the discussion he withdrew a few remarks, and about 10 remarks were taken into account in a compromise formulation. However, the following matters were left to the decision of the leaders of delegations due to the fact that the Romanian delegation absolutely did not agree with the opinion of the six remaining ministers:

- referring to Nuremberg
- a formulation about "systematic violations of the Geneva Accords" on disarmament
- the repercussions of spreading the war in Vietnam by the U.S. on relations with other governments
- contacts and consultations between interested countries on the issue of helping Vietnam
- providing assistance to Vietnam "until final victory"
- an appeal to communist parties and social movements instead of to governments.

4. Meeting of the delegation chiefs on the issue of the statement on Vietnam, July 6, 1966, at 21:00.

As a result of the discussion, Ceaușescu withdrew most of the above-mentioned stipulations; on the other hand the Polish delegation withdrew its proposal regarding contacts, emphasizing that it was doing this only as the last resort since holding on to its proposal would create a situation in which the Romanian comrades would feel they could not sign the text. Some formulations were included in the nature of a compromise. [...] The same evening celebratory signings of the statement regarding the U.S. aggression in Vietnam took place.

[...]

The next day, July 7, 1966 [...], at the plenary session, [...] Cde. Brezhnev informed the assembled that in the course of talks between delegations the view was expressed that it is worthwhile to take this opportunity to exchange information regarding the

current situation in the respective countries, and especially the visits which have recently taken place. In this connection, it was decided to hold yet another unofficial meeting of the leaders of delegations [...]

5. Meeting of heads of delegations devoted to a mutual [exchange] of information.
July 7, 1966, at 15:00.

[...]

A report was read by Marshal Malinovskii regarding the current state of war in Vietnam, after which Brezhnev turned to Ceaușescu so that he could inform those assembled about Romania's problems and visits. Ceaușescu began to make excuses that perhaps it was not worth starting, that it was time to go to a celebration, etc. Then Brezhnev asked directly: You would not be willing to tell us, of course as much as you can, about the visit of Zhou Enlai? Ceaușescu, once again, began to make excuses saying that there was no time [to discuss this].

Ulbricht then spoke: Come on, tell us something about the talks with Zhou Enlai [...] An unpleasant silence set in. Brezhnev said: Well, you don't want to, you don't have to, we do not insist.

Only after this **Ceaușescu** stated:

We had very long talks, so I will only talk about their conclusion. The view of the Chinese comrades on many issues regarding the international situation was in accord with our joint assessment of these problems. The same refers to the necessity of fighting American imperialism and assistance to Vietnam. On a series of other matters of a more general nature, they have different opinions from ours. These are the kind of matters that can be discussed and do not pose obstacles to reaching a mutual understanding.

We spoke a lot about the international situation, about relations with socialist countries and communist parties. We expressed our opinion, and they on the other hand expressed their views on some issues. For example, on the issue of relations with socialist countries. In the final analysis they agreed as to the necessity of strengthening unity, but they raised the issue that they do not find understanding from the side of the socialist countries, and particularly from the Soviet Union. Finally, he said that if those who criticized them publicly admit that they were acting incorrectly, then they could talk. This was the conclusion of his statement.

[...]

As a general conclusion since we have not yet analyzed it, I think that if the socialist countries show more patience, we will try to develop these contacts. There are possibilities to find ways for the development of these contacts. But we will say to you openly: the Chinese bear a lot of distrust towards us. They do not think that we, as socialist countries, are ready to do everything to help Vietnam. We are convinced that the statement regarding Vietnam will have an influence on them (Gomułka: I doubt it), as well as a series of other measures from our side, which will help to dispel this distrust.

[...]

We informed them that we wanted to come out with a joint statement at our conference. They answered: It will be good if there is a good statement. Let us now see what they will say about our statement once they read it. I think that it will please them and that the Vietnamese comrades will also like it

[...]

The meeting of party leaders of communist and workers' nations, the members of the Warsaw Pact on July 7, 1966.

[...]

Cde. Ulbricht: We are continuing our conversation. The ministers of foreign affairs worked very hard. As a result we have a joint document from the ministers, a draft of the statement on Vietnam. I have a question: do the leaderships of delegations think that this draft can be approved? [...]

Cde. Gomulka: I would like to explain what we had in mind while formulating our correction. We had in mind, foremost, consultations between socialist countries and the members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as the countries remaining outside the Pact. For example, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea], Cuba and Mongolia, without excluding China. Our next point is that foremost all over the world, and especially in the so-called Third World (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, and others) there exists an enormous outrage against the American escalation of the war. The point is to take advantage of this outrage and to announce a broader offensive against the aggression. This is what guided us while proposing our correction.

The Romanian comrades are against such a formulation. They are actually limiting the entire issue when they say that first one has to consult Vietnam. It is hard to adopt that only on condition of a consultation with Vietnam. And besides, they limit the consultation to the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

Cde. Gromyko: This restricts very much.

Cde. Novotný: I propose to change and write: with the DRV government and with other interested countries.

Cde. Ceaușescu: I would like to say why we think that this formulation is not good. It can set off a series of discussions. Comrades, you know that a range of countries exists which are coming out with proposals regarding various peace talks. Having left this formulation we are encountering opposition from the Vietnamese comrades who will accuse us of wanting to conduct talks behind their backs. That is why we propose that the main role be bequeathed to Vietnam.

Cde. Gomulka: And what is your attitude towards the proposal of Cde. Novotný?

Cde. Ceaușescu: If we erase: [...] and with other interested countries, then agreed.

Cde. Brezhnev: The point here is to exclude Great Britain and the United States of America. They can comment on this formulation in a variety of ways.

Cde. Gomulka: In this case, perhaps one can formulate it as follows: [...] and with other countries, which support the liberation war.

Cde. Kosygin: We are not able to take any steps without the consent of the Vietnamese.

Cde. Ceaușescu: In this case we propose to erase this point.

Cde. Brezhnev: That's a pity.

Cde. Gomulka: I think that the Vietnamese would be in favor of leaving this point.

Cde. Kádár: We think that it is necessary to aid Vietnam along political and diplomatic lines. The addenda do not give us the opportunity to do so. However, it is

apity that one has to erase this point. I want to propose a correction, similar to the one which was formulated by Cde. Novotný.

Perhaps one could write: with the DRV government, among one another ... and further in the way proposed by the Romanian comrades.

Cde. Novotný: I agree with Cde. Kádár's proposal.

Cde. Brezhnev: I propose: [...] among one another and with other peace-loving countries, which feel the need for consultation while giving assistance for the purpose of repelling American aggression.

Cde. Ceaușescu: But the Vietnamese do not want to talk even with the Yugoslavs. Why create difficulties?

Cde. Kosygin: I propose to formulate this as follows: among one another and with the DRV as well as with other interested countries, which express readiness to fight American aggression.

In this way we will avoid what could also be referred to America and Great Britain.

After all, the Americans are looking for the opportunity for consultation; the same refers to [British Prime Minister Harold] Wilson. But we do not want to consult with them.

Cde. Kádár: First: the DRV government, then among one another, and after that what Cde. Kosygin said.

Cde. Ceaușescu: I do not think that one needs to refer to all the countries. Besides, one has to state clearly that we will consult only when a necessity arises, and the Vietnamese comrades will express their consent.

One can formulate this as follows: [...] contacts among one another, after coming to an understanding with the DRV they will consult regarding new undertakings, which will have the indispensable objective of providing support in the struggle of the Vietnamese nation.

Cde. Brezhnev: If we want to consult with you we will have to ask them for consent?

Cde. Ceaușescu: If we want to call a conference regarding Vietnam or consult with others, then one has to ask them.

Cde. Brezhnev: I propose to erase the third point.

Cde. Ceaușescu: Erase it.

Cde. Ulbricht: How about other comrades?

Cde. Gomułka: I will consent to this only as a last resort, namely, if the Romanian comrades would, due to this, refuse to sign the statement. Then there would be a situation without an exit.

Cde. Ceaușescu: Erase it.

[...]
(Cde. Brezhnev congratulates Cde. Wiesław² and then Cde. Ceaușescu).

Cde. Ulbricht: Therefore, we can say that the statement has been unanimously accepted by everyone. We have finished our work.

[...]

² Transl. note: Gomułka.

[Translated by Małgorzata Gnoińska for the George Washington Cold War Group.]