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**Proposal by Minister of National Defense (Lajos Czinege) to the HSWP Political Committee  
re: the Hungarian Position on the Further Development of the UAF**

**18 June 1966**

ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

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PROPOSAL

Submitted to the Politburo

On the Hungarian position to be presented at the Bucharest meeting concerning the issue of the further  
development of the Unified Armed Forces

(Handwritten)

Copy of the Office of the Central Committee

**I.**

In order to make preparations for the Bucharest meeting the ministers of national defense of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty held a meeting in Moscow on May 27-28, 1966 and achieved the following:

1. They worked out a "Resolution" on the Unified Armed Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty to be submitted to the central committees and the governments of the member states. In this document they stress that "In case a war breaks out the member states of the Warsaw Treaty will make use of all the resources, forces and potentials available to them with full resolve."

The most important issues in the "Resolution" are as follows:

It was possible to settle the issue of the relationship between the Supreme Command and the command bodies of the national armies in a way which reflects the equal rights of the member states far better than before, and thus the issues so far unresolved can also be reconciled. In some detail:

- even those troops of the armies of the member states which are deployed in the Unified Armed Forces stay directly subordinated to their national command bodies;
- the positions of deputy to the supreme commander will not be filled by the ministers of

national defense of the member states but instead the generals appointed to this function by the respective governments;

- In principle it was stated that the supreme commander and his deputies might come from any of the member states;

- the Supreme Command performs its tasks in coordination with the command bodies of the national armies, its recommendations are to be approved by the governments of the member states or by the Political Consultative Committee;

- a joint staff will be set up including members of different nationalities which can ensure effective communication with the staffs of the national armies;

- a general is appointed by every member state as the deputy to the supreme commander who simultaneously represents his own staff at the Supreme Command;

- a new body will be established under the name "Technical Body" that will be responsible for the coordination of technological development and research, military supply services and the armament system and will work together with the Permanent Coordinating Committee for Military Industry of COMECON.

The approval and implementation of these proposals will definitely strengthen the military system of the Unified Armed Forces.

3. Because of some differences of opinion a few important question could not be resolved, or only partial results could be achieved. These are as follows:

a. Everything contained in the "Resolution" is only valid in time of peace, the issue of the command system of the Unified Armed Forces in wartime was not resolved. There was consensus in that the elaboration of the command system in wartime could only be started if the PCC and the governments gave their authorization, in view of the fact that since the decision to go to war, to use nuclear weapons and to engage in armed fighting all belong to the authority of the leading political bodies and the governments of the respective countries.

Therefore the practical implementation of the principles included in the "Resolution" – even after approval – means that the Supreme Command cannot become the integrated leader of the armies of the member states, that is, the actual manager of the military operations, in wartime either, it can only be a body which ensures coordination among the national staffs.

b. For lack of consensus on the part of the Romanian side the military body of the PCC, the Military Consultative Committee, could not be set up. Instead it was put down that the Supreme Command and the ministers of national defense would meet and negotiate if needed, though this solution cannot compensate for the role that could have been played by the recommended Consultative Committee.

4. As a result of the minority opinion of the Romanian side the following questions remained unresolved:

a. The Romanians do not recognize the Political Consultative Committee as a forum which is entitled to make resolutions and decisions. They regard it merely as a consulting body and

insist that exclusively the resolutions of the governments of the member states should be authoritative in issues related to the Unified Armed Forces. Every part of the "Resolution" includes the expression "the Political Consultative Committee or the governments of the member states". The Romanian side believes that functions of the PCC must be studied at the appropriate level.

b. The Romanian side insisted that a Military Committee should be formed coordinated to the supreme commander comprising the supreme commander and his deputies. Several other delegates did not agree with this proposal for it would not enhance the jurisdiction of the supreme commander and his deputies but would be fraught with the danger of actually decreasing the power of the supreme commander as a military leader.

c. They explicitly rejected the proposal that the agreement concerning the representatives of the supreme commander (at the national armies) be present in the document, even as an option, for they maintained that this issue could only be regulated in bilateral agreements between the respective governments.

5. The minutes of the meeting of the ministers of national defense – in addition to those contained in the "Resolution" – the following important comments were recorded:

a. The draft of the "Resolution" must be submitted to the PCC and the governments for approval.

b. The ministers state it is desirable that the supreme commander, the chief of staff (in the rank of first deputy) and the deputies of air defense and armament must be appointed from the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

They also believed it to be important that the supreme commander be the first deputy of the minister of national defense, and the air defense deputy the air defense supreme commander of the Soviet Union.

c. A reduced staff of the Unified Armed Forces must be set up now (some 90 generals and other officers, 30-40 civil employees), while the Technical Body should be filled within a year after the "Resolution" is approved (some 70 generals and other officers). (The full number in the staff was set at 470.)

d. The supreme commander should have a representative in those countries whose governments deem it to be necessary.

e. Our proportionate contribution to the common budget of the Unified Armed Forces as specified in the "Resolution" is 6%.

f. The Soviet government must be requested to cover the expenses of installing the Technical Body as well as the costs of maintaining and guarding the buildings in which it will be placed.

## II.

As for the position to be represented at the Bucharest meeting we forward the following proposal:

The Hungarian delegation should assess the positive experiences of the past 10 years. We must stress that especially in the first period of its operation the Supreme Command gave significant assistance in the shaping of joint strategic-operational principles, in the establishment of a unified structure and training requirements for the troops, in the standardization of the armament systems, in organizing joint military maneuvers, in establishing a unified air defense system, and in making plans for the seat of the military operations. In doing so, it has contributed substantially to the rapid modernization and strengthening of the armies belonging to the Treaty.

However, reaching a new phase of development the leadership has to face more complex tasks whose solution is an important precondition of an effective joint defense system.

We emphasize that the Hungarian People's Republic continues to make efforts to strengthen the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty and – except for concessions on matters of principle – it is ready to endorse any proposal that is aimed to achieve this goal. Therefore:

1. The Politburo should agree to the principles laid down in the "Resolution" and the minutes of the meeting for they essentially suit the Hungarian views and mean a significant step forward with respect to the present situation.

It should authorize the Hungarian delegation to support the approval of the proposals contained in the "Resolution" at the negotiations.

2. Contrary to the Romanian position concerning the Political Consultative Committee our delegation should defend and endorse the right of the PCC for making decisions and resolutions on issues related to the Unified Air Forces too. The straightforward resolution of the role of the PCC is the key to the coalition leadership of the Unified Armed Forces. If it were given a mere consultative role, the Warsaw Treaty would become a loose alliance in which the fundamental issue – the leadership in wartime – would remain unresolved.

The Romanians will probably refer to the text of Clause 6 of the Warsaw Treaty which states that "every state is represented by a member of its government or some other, specially appointed delegate." Contrary to this, the common practice is that the meetings of the PCC are attended by the first secretaries and the prime ministers. Therefore, in our view a modification of the charter that matches the applied practice is in place here.

3. Depending on the situation emerging at the meeting our delegation should also raise the problem of a coalition leadership in time of war by stating that it is also an issue to be resolved at the meeting. (As specified in App. No 1.)

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Budapest, June 18, 1966.

Lajos Czinege

Appendix No 1. to No 00263/1966

**While studying the problems and the possible solutions concerning the command system of the Unified Armed Forces in time of war, the following principles should be borne in mind as a starting point:**

1. The war will be a coalition war, in which each member of the coalition will take its own share in proportion to its own potential. War is not waged only by the armed forces but by the whole state. Therefore the leadership must make sure that the members of the coalition play not only an executive but also a decision-making role in issues that require joint resolution.

The issue of the command system of the Unified Armed Forces is the function of the political, coalition leadership system, thus a final and clear-cut resolution of the pending issues is dependent on the problem of political leadership.

2. Considering the possibility of a rapid breakout of war, the dynamic nature of battlefield activities and their rapid course we will not have a chance either at the beginning or during the war to hold long meetings before important military decisions are adopted. Therefore only proper operative command methods can ensure the effectiveness of the leadership.

3. In the interest of victory the military operations must be implemented in close cooperation of the armies based on uniform planning and ideas, which presupposes a centralized command system. Therefore, with a view toward making our joint defense effective, the principle of sovereignty of the member states should be reconciled with the principle of military integration in a rational fashion.

4. At the breakout of the war there will be neither time nor possibility to wait to see how the wartime command system evolves. Therefore the structures of wartime command must be set up in time of peace, establishing all the necessary legal, organizational and technical conditions for its proper operation.

5. Within the alliance of the socialist countries the Soviet Union plays a leading role, because:

- it is the only superpower among the member states which can provide a basis for the defense against the imperialist coalition with its political and economic strength;

- its armed forces amount to multiples of the forces of the armies of the other member states both in quantity and in quality;

- it is the only one of the member states which possesses nuclear power and other resources that are necessary to fight an intercontinental war.

All this must be reflected in the command system.

Summary:

The wartime command system must be centralized, collective and operative, and the system must be worked out in time of peace, establishing all the necessary conceptual and practical conditions.

The peace time command system is determined principally by the wartime system, but at the same time certain matters of detail may also contribute to the gradual improvement of the command system of the Unified Armed Forces, therefore such details need not be made as a prerequisite of resolving the whole issue of the command system.

Comment: Starting out from these principle we may consider the outcome of the meeting of the ministers of defense to be a considerable achievement in certain minor issues, though the fundamental questions were evaded.

*[Translation by Andreas Bocz]*