
Report on the Summit Meeting of Nine Communist Countries' Leaders of 16-22 October 1966

27 October 1966

REPORT FOR THE POLITBURO on the visit to the Soviet Union

Invited by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union comrades János Kádár, Gyula Kállai and Lajos Czinege stayed in Moscow between 16 – 22 October.

At the same time the Soviet Union hosted the first secretaries, the prime ministers and the ministers of national defense of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Romania.

Comrade Fidel Castro could not leave Cuba, so he requested that president O. Dorticos be invited on his behalf, apart from minister of national defense Raul Castro. The Soviet leaders sent a similar invitation to the leaders of the Vietnamese Democratic Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic as well. However, due to the special situation, the Vietnamese leaders could not take the opportunity, while comrade Kim Il Sung was prevented by illness to accept the invitation.

1. While staying in Moscow the guests took a view of the most recent items of armament of the land troops and air defense forces at an air base near Moscow and at another military base on October 18.

On October 19 – 20 the first secretaries, the prime ministers and the ministers of national defense of the sister parties paid a visit to a space center where a space flight equipment and rocket technology were demonstrated, and then some missiles and space devices were launched in their presence. This part of the program was also attended by members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU. Comrade Malinovsky was unable to attend the program because of illness, the Soviet military leadership was represented by comrade Grechko and other comrades, specified in the communiqué.

The preliminary program draft included a visit to the scientific center in Novosibirsk. The visit was canceled because the leaders of some countries – such as Romania, Poland – had already been there, and they wanted to go home as soon as possible, while comrade W. Ulbricht did not want to take the flight to the center. The Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak delegations, in consensus with the Soviet comrades, urged the participants that the meeting of the leaders of the eight socialist countries should rather be used to discuss timely issues of common interest in an informal fashion. All the participants agreed to meet on Friday, October 21, to exchange information and share views among the leaders of the eight countries.

During our stay in the Soviet Union the Politburo of the **CPSU** gave a lunch on two occasions in honor of their guests.

In addition to the joint programs comrades Kádár, Kállai and Czinege visited the "Interpress" international photo exhibition in Moscow, and went to see the collection of paintings by the Japanese painter K. Hokusai and the works of the French impressionists in the Pushkin Museum.

2. The agenda of the October 21 meeting included an account given by comrade Gromyko of the talks with the American leaders and the General Assembly of UN, then a report by comrade Gomułka on the meeting of the European communist parties to be held later to discuss issues of European security, and finally the approval of a communiqué to be issued following the visit of the delegations of the eight countries to Moscow.

In the course of the six-hour conference several other issues were also raised – such as the assistance to Vietnam, the assessment of the Chinese situation, the issue of a world meeting of communist parties – which were commented by almost all the leaders of the participating delegations. Comrade Dorticos had informed the Soviet comrades beforehand that they only had authorization to listen to the opinion of the representatives of the sister parties but were not in a position to take stand on the issues, so he did not demand the floor to speak.

The participants of the meeting first listened to the reports presented by comrades Gromyko and Gomułka. Then the representatives of each of the parties stated their views on the most important issues. Right after the first speech given by the Hungarian delegation comrade Ceaușescu requested to take the floor and objected to including any issues that went beyond what had been presented by comrades Gromyko and Gomułka, because it would place the Romanian delegation into a difficult position, they were not prepared to discuss any such issues, so they were not willing to participate in any discussion like that. The other delegations pointed out that since it was a meeting of communist parties to exchange ideas freely and nobody was going to propose any resolutions, it would not be right to limit the range of issues which otherwise naturally connected to the reports that had been given. Then the meeting went on in a normal way, comrade Ceaușescu demanded the floor once again and expressed the views of the Romanian party on some issues. The conference, which was attended by the full Politburo and the Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party, included the following main issues:

3. The Vietnamese situation and its perspectives.

When giving an account of his visit to the United States comrade Gromyko said that although the Vietnamese situation was not included on the agenda of the General Assembly, it was still the main issue in most of the contributions. The Soviet foreign minister met with statesmen of 52 countries, and most of the time in these negotiations was devoted to the Vietnamese issue. This was what happened at the meeting with Johnson and Rusk too.

Three quarters of the 121 members, some 90 countries, either directly or indirectly, condemned the aggression by the United States. Only a quarter of the delegations, 29 countries tried to explain or defend the American behavior. All this bears witness to the further isolation of the American position.

In the course of the talks with Johnson and Rusk the American leaders elaborated upon the military aspect of the issue by saying that they were ready to stop the bombings, withdraw the troops and close down the military bases in case the Vietnamese side met one of the following alternatives:

- a. they stop fighting in the south and withdraw their "northern" troops;
- b. the fight comes to an end;
- c. they stop transporting their troops to the south;
- d. The Vietnamese Democratic Republic puts forward some kind of an initiative;
- e. The VDR pledges to give some kind of a response to the US initiatives.

Comrade Gromyko remarked that the first three alternatives had been raised by Rusk at their earlier meeting, while the last two had been proposed by Johnson at their last meeting. As for the political resolution of the Vietnamese situation Johnson and Rusk recommended the following alternatives:

- a. They can see a real possibility of forming a unified government in South Vietnam in accordance with the 1954 Geneva agreement;
 - b. they would agree to a uniform government for the whole of Vietnam based on the results of general elections;
 - c. Vietnam should be neutralized in a way that it does not join any social formation.
- (With respect to this alternative Johnson noted that he did not mean to change the social system of the VDR.)

It seemed to comrade Gromyko that the Americans were trying to find a way out of the war. If the Vietnamese were to merely hint at the possibility of establishing some relations with them once the bombings were stopped and some other steps were taken, the Americans would promptly abandon the air raids. Without the hope of getting something in return the American leaders would not stop the bombings. Johnson does not have to face any significant opposition in his country in the Vietnamese issue. The pursuance of the war in a military sense is no problem for him either. What makes him try to find a way out and to stop the war is the worldwide international isolation of the United States.

The leaders of the socialist countries thanked comrade Gromyko for his account of the situation. All the speakers, including comrade Ceaușescu, emphasized the importance of political initiatives. Comrade Brezhnev stressed that although the Vietnamese did not always provide sufficient information, the Soviet Union would continue to give full support to Vietnam. He proposed that in the near future the foreign ministers of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, or their deputies, should meet in order to work out and coordinate a new diplomatic offensive.

Comrade Kádár expressed his satisfaction with the fact that the resolution of the Bucharest meeting was right and that it was well received all over the world. No American military victory can be anticipated now. No matter how strongly we believe or have confidence in it, a Vietnamese military victory cannot be anticipated either. Therefore the central issue is still the united action of the socialist countries in assisting Vietnam. The behavior of the Chinese sabotaging our joint efforts must be condemned. We still believe it timely that representatives of the socialist countries should convene to coordinate the transportation of goods for Vietnam.

Comrade Zhivkov said that we did not have a clear perspective in the Vietnamese issue. We keep on repeating what the Vietnamese say, which only reflects the opinion of the Vietnamese and the Chinese parties. It seemed to their delegation lead by comrade Mikhaylov that the Vietnamese position had deteriorated in a military sense recently. In the interest of success in our fight we should openly name who

was helping Vietnam and who was hindering our unity. Comrade Gomulka believed that Comrade Zhivkov's assessment was overdone. In the Polish view it is not the aid to Vietnam that is the crucial issue in the present situation, since Vietnam gets as much as they want. It is not the aid that should be increased, but rather we should see to what extent they can make use of it. The Polish ships are docked in the Haiphong harbor without being discharged for months. Most of the goods unshipped get damaged because the Vietnamese comrades are unable to transport them to their destination. He did not endorse the Hungarian proposal concerning the coordination of transportation because it would not change the current situation in any way.

According to the Polish party the Vietnamese war entered an important phase and the political aspects of the war were of primary importance. The further consequences of the situation should be drawn by the Vietnamese first. If they can go on fighting with our help, we should not hasten to draw our own conclusions.

This exchange of ideas could really be valuable if the Vietnamese were also present and we could hear their opinion too. Without it our position is just hanging in the air. At the moment it is not a general discussion that could help, we need more than that, we should come to some concrete conclusions. We should find the favorable opportunity when – not stopping the war in the south but demanding the suspension of the bombings in the north – we could start negotiations as a result of which the war would end in our favor. If the war were to end in the American's favor, it would mean a serious blow to the prestige of the communist movement, the socialist countries and the whole world.

Comrade Ceaușescu stated that according to the Romanian party the Vietnamese wanted to build socialism under peaceful conditions, they did not have aggressive plans; they were only protecting their homeland. In their place the Romanian people would do exactly the same. The Vietnamese told comrade Maurer that every socialist country was helping them, and they laid particular stress on the Soviet Union and China. Pham Van Dong emphasized that all the supplies coming from the socialist countries arrived at their destination in full and in time. The Romanian party does not want to question the words of the Vietnamese, so it does not want to condemn any socialist country in this issue. Vietnam could be assisted in a better way if the general public of the whole world was mobilized. All the parties have something to do in this matter. The American will stop the aggression if they can feel the pressure of the general public of the world.

In response to comrade Ceaușescu's words comrade Brezhnev remarked that the Soviet Union had already initiated the mobilization of international organizations and movements, but what had happened at all these forums before was that instead of stirring up the people all over the world the Chinese delegation had started unjustly slandering the Soviet Union, thereby creating a scandal at these meetings.

4. The issue of the agreement to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In comrade Gromyko's report after many years of controversy a milestone had been reached and the outlines of a reasonable agreement had been laid down. This issue was also given considerable attention in the negotiations with Johnson and Rusk; the American leaders seemed ready to make an agreement. It seems now that under the pressure of the socialist countries the American have decided not to include the German Federal Republic in the atomic club. The Soviet side intends to use the presently positive American attitude

to have them accept as many restrictions as possible. Thus the Soviets have managed to persuade the Americans to agree that no state can get access to nuclear weapons through the alliance it belongs to.

In the future the Soviet Union wants to coordinate the position in an even more precise way before the agreement is signed, consulting with the socialist countries on several occasions as well.

The leaders of the delegations of each of the socialist countries expressed their sincere thanks to comrade Gromyko for his report and agreed with the Soviet position. They stressed that the signing of the agreement would serve the easing of tension in the world and the lessening of the danger of a nuclear war. Comrade Kádár noted that it was not a sin but rather a must to keep in contact with the enemy, to conduct negotiations and make agreements, if it serves our common cause. Comrade Ceaușescu believed it was necessary that the agreement would provide guarantees against nuclear attack to those states that would not have such weapons in the future.

5. The conference of the European communist parties on the issue of European security.

In his account comrade Gromyko said that he had conducted negotiations with comrade Waldeck-Rochet on the practical issues of convening such a meeting.

They suggest that an Editorial Committee should be set up comprising representatives of eight parties to work out the document of the meeting and attend to the necessary practical tasks. The committee would include representatives of the Polish, Soviet, GDR, Romanian, Italian, French, Austrian, and Finish parties. They believe that representatives of every European sister party should be able to participate in the work of the committee that wants to do so. The consultations concerning the setting up of this committee should be finished by January 20, 1967, and then the meeting could be held in the first half of that year. The Editorial Committee would meet in Warsaw, while the conference would convene in Vienna. The parties of the socialist countries would be represented by a member of the Political Bureau of each party. (In the near future a representative of the Polish party will come to Budapest to discuss this issue in detail.)

The leaders of the delegations thanked comrade Gomułka for his account. They stressed that the meeting would serve the resolution of the most important European issue, the increase of the influence of communism, the strengthening of our unity and the concentration of our efforts.

Comrade Kádár agreed with comrade Gomułka's proposals. He emphasized that although the issue of European security was not yet ripe for a final resolution, the current situation was ripe enough so that concrete steps could be taken in this direction. It was quite likely that the issue of European security would come up between states too, so the foreign ministries should bear this possibility in mind and make proposals to their parties and governments. Comrade Ceaușescu stated that the Romanian party had not dealt with this issue yet, so they were not yet ready to take up a position but he thought it necessary to note that the issues of European security should perhaps be negotiated between states. If the parties monopolize the initiative, it is to be feared that the idea would fail to attract the masses. Because of the negative results of such regional party meetings in the past the Romanian party is averse to any such conferences.

6. The issue of convening a new international conference of communist and workers' parties.

Comrade Brezhnev established that the international communist movement had a dilemma to face. We have to decide: Either we continue to keep silent, fearing the unity that has long been denounced by the Chinese anyway, or we take into account the present situation of the international communist movement and take some concrete steps in order to clean it up. The Chinese party endorses a deviation that has to be clarified for the sake of our common cause. The world conference is also necessary to work out a coordinated course of action for the future in this complex international situation. We will also have to harmonize our work to do in order to counter the effects of the infiltration policy of the imperialists for a longer historical perspective.

In the near future it seems necessary that the idea of convening the world meeting be kept on the agenda. The conference must be held even if it is not be attended by the Chinese Communist Party and 2 or 3 other parties.

With the exception of the Romanian comrades the participants agreed with the idea of a world conference. They stressed that the tactics used to counter the attitude of the CCP in the past two years had proven successful.

Comrade Kádár stated: The events in Beijing demonstrate that we will not be able to make an agreement with them for a long time. The Chinese leaders try so hard to break with us that they cannot even tolerate neutrality. Five or six years ago it seemed to many parties that it was enough if three Chinese and three Soviet leaders sat down to negotiate, and unity was restored. Now this illusion is a thing of the past. Today it is evident to everybody that the reason are much more profound than that. We are now preparing for our party congress, we own responsibility to our nation and our party, so we cannot keep quiet about the main issues of the international communist movement. We would renounce our internationalist principles if we did not consider the issues of our unity.

Comrade Novotný pointed out: our parties do not belong to the Second International where everybody does what he wants. We need a common, coordinated concept. This can only be worked out by the world conference. The line of the Chinese party deviates from Marxism in fundamental ways. It is the responsibility of all of us to expose this deviation.

Comrade Gomułka stated: the main feature of the new situation is that the CCP exposed itself as a party which does not want unity to counter imperialism. This attitude is the main reason why many parties have distanced themselves from the CCP. Time will ripen the conditions of the world conference. The situation is different now than what it was two years ago. The international communist party needs a common position. We cannot stay quiet; we must express our opinion on the dissident Chinese policy. In the near future there seems no possibility of including the CCP into a unified anti-imperialist front. Therefore there is no point waiting, we have to do what needs to be done, thereby assisting the Chinese communists to find their way back to a normal course. The main goal of the conference will not be the excommunication of the Chinese but rather an endeavor to guide them back to the right way, to our common camp. According to comrade Gomułka after the meeting of the European parties we can come back to some concrete steps concerning the world conference.

According to comrade Ceaușescu the idea of a world conference is not timely now either, for the situation – precisely because of Vietnam – is not fit for such a meeting. Though there are several issues in the international communist movement pending a resolution, under the present circumstances they should be

discussed in the form of bilateral negotiations between the sister parties. It seems even more important that – with a great sense of responsibility – every party should analyze these issues profoundly.

7. The events taking place in China.

The representatives of the fraternal parties talked about the events in China with great concern.

Comrade Brezhnev maintained that the political processes we have witness in China threatened the power of the proletariat. In recent years the anti-Soviet sentiment and the dissident views on the part of the Chinese had become unrestrained. We can observe a decrease in the influence of the party and an increase in the influence of the military. The leading bodies of the party are now replaced by the military. The wild anti-Soviet instigations have been a matter of great concern, leading the CC of the CPSU to inform the party members in a closed letter about the events in China.

Comrade Kádár stressed: What is taking place in China now cannot be regarded as an internal affair. We do not entertain our people with juicy Beijing bits, yet we have to distance ourselves from what is going on there, for the ordinary people might place blame the communists for all this in the final analysis.

Comrade Gromyko noted: during his stay in the US Johnson and Rusk told him that they were in regular contact with the Chinese People's Republic. The Soviet Union urged the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to UN this year again, but it seems now that a number of Asian countries are much less enthusiastic in endorsing it than before. The representatives of 52 countries that comrade Gromyko talked with in New York unanimously stated that the present cultural campaign would isolate China politically.

Comrade Ceaușescu said that he did not want to take a stand on the Chinese issue, for it does not belong here.

8. The German issue.

Comrade Gomułka mentioned that the German issue was a central one in Europe. In their relations with the German Federal Republic the member states of the Warsaw Treaty must follow a unified and coordinated line. Bonn is seeking weak points among us, trying to squeeze concessions out of some of us, so that it can then blackmail other socialist countries. It has already achieved some success in this respect. The current interior situation in the FRG is worthy of attention. The possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded; it is quite likely that Erhard will leave the scene. This is also a reason why should take the German issue very seriously. The Polish party proposes that the foreign ministers, or their deputies, of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty should convene in the near future in order to discuss a unified position as an answer to the German proposals.

9. The Soviet – American relations.

Comrade Gromyko informed us that Johnson had sent an invitation through him to the Soviet leaders to visit the United States; at the same time he indicated that he would also like to visit the Soviet Union. The public response to the invitation was given by comrade Brezhnev when talking at the Soviet – Polish friendship

meeting, where he pointed out that the development of the Soviet – American relations was directly dependent on the aggression in Vietnam.

10. In the course of the exchange of opinion all the delegations welcomed again the initiatives of the Soviet comrades and thanked them for the invitation to view the new military technology. What they saw made a great impression on them and filled them with satisfaction. The weapons that were demonstrated showed a significant development of the Soviet army and convinced the delegations that they would ensure greater security for all the socialist countries. As a whole, what they saw also painted a true picture of the dimension of the readiness to sacrifice on the part of the soviet people.

11. The participants of the conference also talked highly of the discussions. They established that by knowing each other's views they could secure the political orientation of the sister parties, and the exchange of ideas served the cause of our common fight very well. It became obvious from the speeches of the representatives of the eight parties that seven of them shared exactly the same views as to what should be considered to be the major issues in the international communist movement as well as in the course of action to be followed. The otherwise well-known dissident views of the Romanian party became completely isolated at the conference.

12. When discussing the joint communiqué to be issued on our visit to the Soviet Union comrade Kádár suggested that we should write in it that there was consensus on the issues that had been discussed. Comrade Ceaușescu objected to this proposal, saying that this statement would not be in accord with the real situation. Then this proposal was rejected and the text was not included in the final version of the communiqué.

13. While staying in Moscow comrade Brezhnev told comrade Kádár that comrades Dorticos and R. Castro would spend some more time in Moscow. In the negotiations with them the issue of further economic aid to Cuba would be discussed. At the repeated invitation of comrade Fidel Castro comrade Brezhnev will probably visit Cuba in the first quarter of next year. Comrade Brezhnev and his associates believe that it would be desirable if the leaders of some other socialist countries would also visit Cuba to exert an influence on the Cuban comrades.

14. Concerning the future of U Thant, comrade Gromyko said that there was something feigned in the behavior of the Burmese diplomat. U Thant said he would reconsider the possibility of working as secretary general of UN at the end of the year, in light of the circumstances prevailing then. Since Ne Win dissuaded him from returning to Burma, he will most likely accept another term as secretary general.

RESOLUTION

1. The Politburo acknowledges the report with approval.
2. The Politburo agrees with the proposal of the Soviet comrades that the foreign ministers of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, or their deputies, should convene to discuss the content and the methods of the diplomatic offensive aimed at helping Vietnam. Taking into consideration that after the Romanian rejection the Polish comrades also find it undesirable, the Politburo removes from the

agenda the proposal which would aim at convening an inter-party meeting to discuss issues related to the transportation of supplies to Vietnam.

3. The Politburo agrees that we should all work together to establish the conditions necessary for a wide-ranging conference of communist and workers' parties so that the meeting could be convened sometime in the middle of next year, or even sometime this year.

4. The Politburo endorses the Polish proposal put forward at the Moscow conference with a view to convening an international party meeting for the discussion of European security.

5. The Politburo agrees with the proposal of the Polish comrades that the foreign ministers of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, or their deputies, should meet to coordinate a unified response to the proposal made by the German Federal Republic.

6. The Politburo proposes that comrade Gyula Kállai should give an account of the visit to Moscow at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, speaking only about the aspects of the conference, which can be discussed at a government meeting.

Budapest, October 25, 1966.

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